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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
FRITO-LAY and/or TRANS- : 
CONTINENTAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY. : 
Appellant/Petitioner. : 
vs. : Case No. 20061053 - CA 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION and : Labor Commission No. 2003892 
AMY C. CLAUSING, 
: Priority 7 
Appellees/Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
AMY C. CLAUSING (EMPLOYEE) 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT REGARDING 
RULE 24, UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
The Utah Supreme Court has endeavored on numerous occasions to emphasize to 
counsel the importance of professionalism and civility in the practice of law and has adopted 
Rule 24 (k), Ut. R. Civ. P. which provides that "[a]U briefs under this rule must be . . . free 
from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters." As that Court recently 
noted1, the term "scandalous" includes statements which are defamatoiy and offensive to 
propriety. 
As the Court will note, in numerous locations throughout Employer's Brief, such 
scandalous statements are most inappropriate!}' directed at Employee and. more particularly, 
at Employee's counsel, K. Dawn Atkin. The most offensive of those statements involve 
'Peters v.Pine Meadow Ranch Home Association, 2007 UT 2,4 (Utah. Jan. 12,2007) 
Employer's personal attacks against Ms. Atkin asserting that she violated Rule 3.1 of the 
Rules of Professional Conduct because: 
She knows that her interpretation of the Order , if followed, would make the 
Order contrary to the evidence and the law. She is knowingly misusing 
ambiguous language, and thereby, abusing legal procedure.2 
The record does not support those scandalous accusations. They are false and were 
made with either actual knowledge, or with reckless disregard, of that falsity. Either way, 
such statements set forth in Employer's Brief constitute a serious violation of the provisions 
o f Rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and should be appropriately addressed by this 
Court. 
JURISDICTION 
As reflected in Employer's Docketing Statement, the Judgment or Order appealed 
from is the Order of the Commission dated October 24,2006. That Order of the Commission 
dismissed Employer's Rule 60(b) Motion and struck the March 17, 2006 decision of Judge 
Sessions in which he decided the merits of that Motion against Employer. As that Order 
reflects, it neither addressed nor affected the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 
of Judge Sessions dated September 23, 2005, as to which the Employer had not filed any 
timely Request for Review, and which had become final on October 24, 2005. 
Employer's Brief, p. 16 
This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal from the October 23, 2006" Order oi the 
Appeals Board of the Labor Commission, pursuant to Utah Code Anno. §34A-2-801 (8) 
(2003). §63-46b-16 (1998). and §78-2a-3 (2) (a). 
With respect, however, this Court does not have jurisdiction to determine whether 
Judge Sessions* abused his discretion in denying the Rule 60(b) Motion. That issue must be 
addressed in the first instance b) the Labor Commission. In the event the Court determines 
the Commission committed reversible error in determining that Rule 60(b) had no application 
to this proceeding and mat such error was prejudicial to the Employer, the Court should 
appropriately remand the matter to the Commission for its review and determination of 
whether Judge Sessions abused his discretion in denying the Employer's Rule 60(b) Motion. 
Neither does this Court have jurisdiction over any purported appeal from the Findings 
of Fact. Conclusions of Law and Order of Judge Sessions dated September 23. 2005. as to 
which the Employer failed to file a timel} Request for Review, a statutory prerequisite to 
judicial review.4 
'Order Dismissing Respondents* Rule 60(b) Motion. R. 460 
4Utah Code Anno. §34A-2-801 (8)(c) ["A part}7 claiming to be aggrieved ma} seek 
judicial review7 onl> if the part} has exhausted the parties remedies before the commission 
as provided by this section."] 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
As previously reflected in the Employee's Motion for Summary Disposition, the sole 
issue on this appeal is whether the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission committed 
reversible error in its Order dated October 23, 2006, which dismissed Employer's Motion 
pursuant to Rule 60 (b), Ut. R. Civ. P., declaring that Rule was not cognizable in this 
workers' compensation proceeding. The remaining "Issues" outlined in Petitioner's Brief 
are not properly before this Court. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review varies in this matter, depending upon which of the various 
issues set forth in Employer's Brief is being considered. Matters of statutory construction 
are questions of law that are generally reviewed for correctness."6 However, when reviewing 
the Commission's interpretation of its own rules, the Court applies "an intermediate standard 
of review, deferring to an agency's interpretation as long as it is both reasonable and 
rational."7 
The standard of review for mixed questions of law and fact has been summarized as 
follows: 
In this case, the Legislature has granted the Commission discretion to 
determine the facts and apply the law to the facts in all cases coming before it. 
See Utah Code Ann. §34A-1-301 (1997) . . . As such, we must uphold the 
Employer's Brief, p. 1 
6Esquivel v. Labor Comm % 2000 UT 66, 7 P. 3d 777 (Utah, 2000). 
1
 Barnard & Burk Group, Inc. v. Labor Commission, 2005 UT App. 401, 122 P. 3d 
700, 703 (Utah App., 2005). 
-4-
Commission's determination .. . unless the determination exceeds the bounds 
of reasonableness and rationality so as to constitute an abuse of discretion 
under 63-46b-l 6(h )(i) of the UAPA. . .. Moreover, we resolve. ~*[a]n) doubt 
respecting the right of compensation in favor of the injured employee/ "Drake 
v Industrial Comm >?. 939 P. 2d 177. 182 (Utah, 1997)(citation omitted).s 
There do not appear to have been am reviews of a denial of a Rule 60(b) Motion from 
the Labor Commission. However, this Court has previous])' recognized that such a denial 
b) a trial court will be reversed onh when an "abuse of discretion" has been established.4 
That the same standard should be applicable to an appeal from the denial of a Rule 60(b) 
determination made b) the Labor Commission. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Anno. §34A-2-801 (2006) provides the basic statutor) requirement for 
timel) filing of Motions for Review7. It provides, in pertinent part: 
(2) Unless a party in interest appeals the decision of an administrative law 
judge in accordance with Subsection (3). the decision of an administrative law 
judge on an application for hearing filed under Subsection (1) is a final order 
of the commission 30 days after the date the decision is issued. The 
commission, the commissioner, an administrative law7 judge, or the appeals 
Board, is not bound by the usual common lavs or statutor) rules of evidence, 
or b) an)7 technical or statutor) rules of evidence, or by any technical or formal 
rules or procedure, other than as provided in this section or as adopted by the 
commission * * * 
(3) (a) A party in interest may appeal the decision of an administrative law 
judge b) filing a motion for review with the Division of Adjudication within 
30 days of the date the decision is issued. 
hAE Clevile v. Labor Comm n, 996 P. 2d 1072, 1074 (Utah App.. 2000), cert den. 
4 P. 3d 1289 (Utah. 2000). 
"Jensen v. Foote. 2005 UT App. 156. % 20 (Utah App.. 2005); Franklin Covey Client 
Sales, Inc. v. Melvin, 393 Ut. Adv. Rep. 23. 2000 UT App. 110. j^ 9 (Utah App.. 2000) 
-5-
(8) (c) A party7 claiming to be aggrieved may seek judicial review only if the 
party has exhausted the party's remedies before the commission as provided 
by this section. 
Similarly Administrative Rule R602-2-l(M) provides for review of Orders by 
Administrative Law Judges and specifies that such review must be requested within thirty 
days in accordance with the Motion for Review provisions of Utah Code Anno. §§63-46b-12 
and 34A-1-303 (1997). 
Utah Code Anno., §34A-l-304 (1) (a) (1997) provides that the Commission "shall 
make rules governing administrative procedures." Subsection (b) further specifies, "the 
rules made under this section are not required to conform to common law or statutory rules 
of evidence or other technical rules of procedure." In accordance with those provisions, 
Administrative Rule R602-2-1, as adopted by the Labor Commission, provides for only 
limited incorporation of the Ut. R. Civ. P. It does not adopt Rule 60(b).10 
Rule 60 (b), Ut. R. Civ. P. provides, in pertinent part: 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance 
of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, 
order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, 
surprise, or excusable neglect. . . . A motion under this Subdivision (b) does 
not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. 
,0R602-2-l (F)(4) [Depositions pursuant to Ut. R. Civ. P.; R602-2-KFW) [sanctions 
under Rule 3 7]; R602-2-1 (G) [Subpoenas served as provided in Ut.R.Civ.P.; and R602-2-1 
(N) ["generally follow the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure regarding discovery and the 
issuance of Subpoenas"]. 
-6-
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE AND COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Administrative Law Judge. Dale W. Sessions, entered Amended Findings of Fact. 
Conclusions of Law, and Order to Correct Benefit Computation Omission on September 23. 
2005. In that Order. Judge Sessions determined Employee had met the burdens of both legal 
and medical cause, that she was injured while working for Employer on March 18.1999. and 
that she did not reach medical stability until June 10. 2004. The Order further declared that 
Employee w7as. therefore, entitled to workers compensation benefits related to her injury. In 
addition to entering an award for the medical expenses and permanent partial disability 
benefits, the Order of Judge Sessions incorporated the medical panel report and Stipulation 
of the parties by reference and Ordered, in pertinent part: 
9. Petitioner is awrarded temporary total disability compensation from March 
18. 1999 to June 10. 2004. The applicable computation rate is $487.00 per 
week; and 
14. Respondent is permitted an offset for amounts previously paid by 
Respondent(s) in all areas of this award.11 
That Order embodied a significant judicial error in that it awarded the maximum 
temporary total disabilit) benefits at the rate of $487.00 per week for the entire period from 
the date of injur} on March 18, 1999 through the date she reached medical stability on June 
10, 2004.12 While Employee wras entitled to disability7 benefits for that entire period, those 
"Amended Finding of Facts. Conclusions of Law and Order to Correct Benefit 
Computation Omission of Judge Sessions dated September 23, 2005. R. 151 - 153 
12Utah Code Anno. §34A-2-410 (1999) [(l)(a) In case of temporary disability7, so long 
as the disability is total the employee shall receive 66 2/3% of that employee's average 
-7-
benefits should have been divided between temporary total disability while she was off work, 
based upon the full $487.00 per week maximum, and temporary partial disability taking into 
consideration those weeks, and the earnings she received, while engaged in light duty work.13 
Since that outcome was contemplated by the parties, those periods of light duty work, and 
the amounts earned, were fully set forth in paragraph 12 of the Stipulation of the parties,14 
which was incorporated in that Order. 
Paragraph 12 set forth each of the various dates during which Employee had been able 
to perform light duty work, together with the various weekly amounts she was able to earn 
during those periods. That paragraph concluded by noting that the Stipulation was entered 
into on September 15, 2004 and that 'Temporary total or temporary partial disability 
thereafter will need to be addressed at a later date. , ,b 
After Judge Sessions issued his Order on September 23, 2005, Employer failed to 
timely file a Motion for Review to appeal that Order. Employer also failed to pay the 
benefits awarded to Employee under the terms of that Order, or any part of those benefits. 
weekly wages at the time of the injury but: (i) not more than a maximum of 100% of the state 
average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week."] 
13Utah Code Anno. §34A-2-411 (1999) ["(1) If the injury causes temporary partial 
disability for work, the employee shall receive weekly compensation equal to: (a) 66 2/3% 
of the difference between the employee's average weekly wages before the accident and the 
weekly wages the employee is able to earn after the accident, but not more than 100% of the 
state average weekly wage at the time of the injury (plus $5.00 for each of her two dependent 
children)] 
Stipulation of Facts and Proposed Medical Panel Questions, R. 105 at 109 
]SId. 
-8-
On December 20. 2005. Employee finally requested the Commission 10 issue an 
Abstract of the Award in order to enforce the award against Employer.16 
On December 21. 2005. Employer filed a "Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief from 
Judgment/'17 asking Judge Sessions to set aside his award. Judge Sessions considered 
Employer's allegations, together with the factual background of the case and Employer's 
actions. On March 17, 2006. Judge Sessions entered his Order denying Employer's Rule 
60(b) Motion.18 That Order found that Employer's assertions were "'not indicative of 
mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect"19 and that. "It would be unjust to set the 
amended order aside under the facts of this case."20 
Employer then filed a Motion for Review with the Appeals Board of the Labor 
Commission to review Judge Sessions Order denying Employer's Rule 60(b) Relief21 
On October 23. 2006. the Appeals Board issued its Order Dismissing Respondent's 
Rule 60(b) Motion22 and this Appeal followed. 
16R. 155 
17R. 163 
18Amended Order Denying Rule 60(b) Motion Filed by Respondent and Denying 
Reconsideration of the Order. R. 334 
]isId. at 335 
2{]Id. 
21R. 338 
22Supra, note 3 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In its Brief, Employer has failed to set forth various portions of the facts which are 
relevant and material to this action, but which fail to support its assertions. Employer has set 
forth other asserted facts based upon its own interpretations of those facts rather than the 
facts themselves. Employee has, therefore, addressed its Statement of Facts to reflect the 
relevant and material facts of this case, as reflected by the record. 
1. The underlying Order of Judge Sessions23 awarded Employee temporary total 
disability benefits for the entire period from the date of her work related injury on March 18, 
1999, through the date she reached medical stability on June 10,2004, at the rate of $487.00 
per week24, which is a total of $126,814.34 (after deduction of the $6,136.60 previously 
paid). When combined with the applicable interest at 8% per annum from the dates those 
payments were due through December 15,2005 of $56,747.51, that brought the total amount 
of the award to $183?561.85.25 
2. That Order embodied a significant judicial error in that failed to apply appropriate 
adjustments to the temporary disability award for the various times between March 18, 1999 
to June 10, 2004, when Employee was earning a lesser income performing light duty work, 
23Supra, note 11 
24Id., Supra, note 3 
^Computations accompanying letter from K. Dawn Atkin to Mr. Kanell dated 
December 1, 2005, R. 214. See also computations accompanying proposed Abstract of 
Award and computations forwarded to Judge Sessions dated December 20, 2005, R. 155 
-10-
in accordance w ith paragraph 12 ofthe Stipulaiion which was incorporated into that Order.20 
3. As reflected in that Stipulation. Employee was not able to earn the $900.00 per 
week she was previoush earning during that period from March 18. 1999 to June 10.2004.27 
However, she was able to work in a light duty capacit) during various times, and with 
various earnings, during that period. Paragraph 12 ofthe Stipulation specified: 
"Petitioner continued to work for Frilo-la) in a light duty capacity from 
3/18'99 to 5/17/99 earning $400.00 per week. However, she was unable to 
perform her duties with Frito-La) and the employment ended. Thereafter, 
petitioner continued to work in a light duty capacit) as follows: 
5/8/99 petitioner started working for Orbit earning $11.48/hr: 
5/8/99 to 12/29/99 restricted to 20hrs/wk. Earned $228/wk 
12/30/99 to 1/10/00 (1st knee surgery) Unable to work. 
1/11/00 to 2/28/00 40 hrs/week. Earned $456.00/wk 
2/29/00 to 4/30/00 restricted to 20 hrs/wk. Earned $228/wk. 
5/1/00 to 5/20/00 40 hrs/week $456.00 wk 
5/21/00 to 5/30/00 (1st elbow surgery) Unable to work. 
5/31/00 to 6/21/00 40 hrs/week $456.00/wk 
6/22/00 to 6/28/00 (2nd elbow surgery) Unable to work. 
6/29/00 to 8/16/00 40 hrs/week "$456.00/wk 
8/17/00 to 9/11/00 (2nd knee surgery) Unable to work. 
9/12/00 to 10/2/00 restricted to 20 hrs/wk. Earned $228/wk 
10/3/00 to 4/4/02 40 hours/week $456.00/wk 
4/5/02 to 4/18/02 (3rd knee surgery - hardware removal) Unable to work. 
4/19/02 to 5/30/02 restricted to 20 hrs/wk. Earned $228/wk 
5/31/02 to 10/19/02 40 hrs/week $456.00 wk 
10/20/02 changed jobs to ISG earning $12.48/hr 
10/20/02 to 5/5/03 40 hrs/week $499.20/wk 
5/5/03 Laid off from 1SG 
5/5/03 to 3/1/04 no work 
3/1/04 Began working at Pacific Rim earning $12.00/hr 
1/04 (sic) to 6/25/04 40 hrs/week $480/wk 
5/25/04 (sic) laid off from Pacific Rim" 
2bSupra. note 14 at ^ [12 
27M.atTi3 
11 _ 
Paragraph 12 of that Stipulation went on to specify, aThe parties created this 
stipulation on September 15,2004. Temporary total or temporary partial disability thereafter 
will need to be addressed at a later date." 
4. Employee submitted her pre-hearing disclosures28 prior to that Stipulation. In it, 
she specified that Employee was seeking, among other benefits, temporary total disability, 
temporary partial disability, and further permanent partial disability benefits. Employee also 
stated, at paragraph 9 (c): wCWe believe that the full payment of TTD and TPD was not paid 
after the various knee surgeries. However, there does not seem to be any dispute regarding 
the dates and we hope to have this issue resolved before the hearing."29 
5. The parties were able to resolve the dispute regarding those dates prior to the 
scheduled hearing, as reflected at paragraph 12 of their Stipulation, as previously referenced. 
6. In accordance with the Stipulation, the matter was subsequently submitted to a 
Medical Panel. The Medical Panel Report was returned and properly forwarded to all parties 
on August 19,2005. In that Report, the Panel responded to the AL J's questions, in pertinent 
part, as follows: 
(1) Is there a medically demonstrable causal connection between the 
petitioner's current medical condition and the alleged incident which occurred 
on or about 21 May, 2000? 
A. With regard to the right knee, it appears that the aggravation from 
the above accident is legitimate and the petitioner is stable at this time, albeit 
it is anticipated she will have recurrent episodes and may require further 
treatment. 
28R. 375 
29M 
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B. The lew back condition appears to be ongoing and appears to be a 
permanent aggravation of a pre-existing condition from the industrial accident 
ofl 8 March. 1999. * * * 
(2) When did the petitioner's Condition stabilize as a result of the 
incident on or about 21 Ma). 2000? 
We feel that the petitioner stabilized when Dr. Morgan indicated on 10 
June 2004 that he had nothing else to offer and her condition had not 
changed.30 
7. Employer filed an Objection to thai Medical Panel Report.31 but failed to file it 
within the time period required. Counsel for Employee proper!) submitted a written 
Response to that Objection.32 Judge Sessions thereafter rejected Employer's Objection as 
untimely, rendering it unnecessary for him to consider Employee's Response.33 
8. Although Judge Sessions did not consider Employee's Response, it was. 
nevertheless, fonvarded to Employer's Counsel as reflected in that Response.34 prior to the 
Judge's rejection of Employer's Objection. In that Response, Employee explained: 
Finally, I must admit to being confused by respondents claim of a 
stipulated stabilization date. The current Stipulation of Facts and Proposed 
Medical Panel Questions includes a complete outline of petitioner's income 
from 1999 to 2004 so that Temporary Partial Disability could be calculated if 
petitioner was found not to be at MMI. (Stipulation of Fact and Proposed 
Medical Panel Questions, pg. 5.) Stabilization was a primary issue in this case 
as reflected in the parties stipulated proposed question #3. If the fusion 
30R. 113. at 116 
3,R. 120 
32R. 144 
23Supra, note 11 
3ASupra. note 32, at 145 
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surgery is not reasonable, has petitioner reached MMI? I do not understand 
why respondents would now argue that we stipulated to a January 14. 2002 
MMI date. 
We respectfully request that the Medical Panel Report be admitted into 
evidence. 
It appears that TTD and TPD have not been paid correctly throughout 
this claim. (Compare TTD paid, Stipulation page 3, with the income chart, 
Stipulation pg. 5) Therefore, we request an order for Temporary7 Total 
Disability/Temporary Partial Disability through MMI of June 10, 2004, less 
amounts actually paid, plus 8% interest. I would be happy to prepare a chart 
of these benefits if it would be helpful.3:> 
9. In accordance with the provisions of Utah Code Anno. §34A-2-410 (2) (2006): 
In the event a light duty medical release is obtained prior to the employee 
reaching a fixed state of recovery, and when no light duty employment is 
available to the employee from the employer, temporary disability benefits 
shall continue to be paid. 
However, §34A-2-411(1999) reduces that obligation of the Employer when the injury 
causes only partial disability for work, prior to medical stability, in which event the 
employee's disability compensation is reduced to equal: 
"(a) 66-2/3% of the difference between the employee's average weekly wages before 
the accident and the weekly wages the employee is able to earn after the accident, but 
not more than 100% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury; plus 
$5.00 . . . for each dependent child . . ." 
10. Judge Session's Order should have reflected an appropriate adjustment in the 
award of temporary disability benefits for those various periods of time between March 18, 
1999 through June 10, 2004, as reflected in that Stipulation of the parties, during which 
Employee was working on a light duty basis for her Employer or others. If the required 
35Id. 
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adjustments had been made, the award would have been significant!} less. As reflected in 
Employee's letter of December L 2005 and the attached computations, if those required 
adjustments had been made, the Award would have onh amounted to $92,956.46 (after 
deducting the $6.136.66 previous!) paidbx Employer). When combined with the applicable 
interest at 8% per annum from the dates those payments were due through December 15, 
2005 of $30,104.76. that brought the total amount of the award to $123.061.20.36 
11. Employer failed to timeh file any Motion for Review or Motion for 
Reconsideration before the Order became final. 
12. Beginning on November 4.2005. Employee's attorney placed several calls to one 
of Frito-Lay's attorneys and left messages requesting payment of Employee's disability 
compensation. Frito-Lay's attorney did not return those calls.37 
13. On December 1.2005. Employee's attorney got through to another of Frito-Lay's 
attorneys. In that telephone conversation. Employee's attorney pointed out that Judge 
Sessions' decision awarded a larger sum of disability compensation than was warranted 
under the parties' stipulated facts. Employee's attorney advised that, notwithstanding Judge 
Sessions' award. Employee would accept the lesser amount of disability7 compensation 
consistent with the stipulated facts.18 
"
b
 Supra, note 25 
r]
 Supra, note 3, at 461 
38M 
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14. In a letter dated December 6,2005, Frito-Lay *s attorney rejected that offer, based 
on the attorney's own evaluation of Employee's claim and without reference to the terms of 
Judge Session's decision.39 
15. After rejecting Employee's demand for payment, Frito-Lay took no action to 
challenge Judge Sessions' decision, nor did Frito-Lay pay the compensation awarded to her 
by that decision.40 
16. On December 20, 2005, Employee asked Judge Sessions to issue an abstract of 
judgment so she could force Frito-Lay to pay the compensation.41 
17. On December 21,2005, Employer filed a document entitled CwRule 60(b) Motion 
for Relief from Judgment" asking Judge Sessions to set aside his award of temporary total 
disability compensation and to conduct an evidentiary hearing on that issue.42 
18. On March 17, 2006, Judge Sessions denied Employer's Motion on the grounds 
that Frito-Lay had not satisfied the standards set forth in Rule 60(b) Ut. R. Civ. P. for 
granting such a request.43 More specifically, in that Order, Judge Sessions found and 
determined: 
Respondent filed his motion 90 days after the entry of the final order. 
However, Respondent has failed to make his case out for the relief requested 
39Id. 
"Id. 
"Id. 
42Id. 
43Id. 
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in that insufficient grounds for mistake, surprise or excusable neglect exists. 
Respondent failed to return telephone calls to Petitioner's counsel and grossh 
neglected to request relief from the order b> wa> oi appeal within the 30 days 
allowed b) law and rule for such relief il he in fact was confused b> the 
amended order itself 
Given thehiston of the attempts to communicate between counsel after 
the order issued, and the fact that Respondent waited too long to file an appeal, 
it would be unjust for the order to be set aside at this time. If Respondent was 
truh confused, his efforts should have focused on clearing that confusion by 
wa\ of motion for review within the appropriate period instead of trying to 
rescue the dela) by this method. In addition. Respondent advances the 
Affidavit of Andrew Wadsw orth which demonstrates that Respondent intended 
to dispute the claimed amount, but onh announced that to Counsel for 
Petitioner on December 1.2005. a period still beyond the appeal period. Then 
some 20 days later Respondent filed the current motion. This is not indicative 
of mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect. It would be unjust to set the 
amended order aside under the facts of this case. * H' * 
Because no appeal was taken, and because the motion for relief from 
judgment was filed without sufficient grounds made out as required in Rule 
60, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as outlined above, the Rule 60(b) Motion 
for Relief from Judgment must be denied.44 
As reflected above. Judge Session's Order was not limited to a determination, as claimed by 
Employer, that, "he had no authority to correct the misinterpretation or mistake.'*45 
19. Employer did file a Motion for Review with the Appeals Board of the Labor 
Commission for review of Judge Session's Order denying that Motion. The Appeals Board 
dismissed the Rule 60(b) Motion, finding: 
In summary, the Appeals Board concludes that adjudication of Ms. Clausing's 
workers' compensation claim is governed by the provisions of UAPA, the 
Labor Commission Act. and the Utah Workers* Compensation Act. These 
statutes do not authorize Frito-Lay's attempt to use Rule 60 (b), U.R.C.P.. as 
1Supra, note 18 
^Employer's Brief. Statement of Facts No. 16 
a method to obtain relief from Judge Sessions' decision of September 23, 
2005. Because Frito-Lay's purported Rule 60(b) motion was not cognizable 
in this workers' compensation proceeding, Judge Sessions' decision addressing 
the merits of the Rule 60 (b) motion is a nullity.46 
20. In a previous proceeding between the parties, Case No. 2001163, 
Administrative Law Judge, Sharon Eblen,did enter an Order dated October 22, 2002, as 
attached as Exhibit "F" to Employer's Brief. That Order found Employer liable for the 
industrial knee and low back injury, as well as the subsequent May 21,2000 fall, and ordered 
payment of certain undisputed but unpaid permanent partial disability compensation. That 
Order did not address the issue of temporary disability benefits in any manner nor did it 
indicate, as Employer states in its Brief, that, "No Temporary Total Disability was awarded, 
inasmuch as Clausing was working at the time, and all time where she had not worked up to 
that date, October 22, 2002, had already been paid."47 
21. Employee's Application for the present hearing specifically sought, among other 
benefits, temporary partial disability benefits, together with temporary total disability benefits 
for the various periods when she was wholly unable to work due to treatment for surgeries 
prior to reaching medical stability.48 
22. There is no factual basis for Employer's claim of any "intentional 
misinterpretation" of Judge Session's Order by Employee's Counsel. Rather, the language 
of the Order was sufficiently clear and unambiguous for the Appeals Board to interpret the 
46Supra, note 3 
47Employer's Brief, p. 4. 
48R. 1 
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Order in precisely the same manner as Employee and her counsel. As stated b\ the appeals 
Board in the Order from which Employer now appeals: 
The decision awarded temporary total disability compensation to Ms. Clausing 
for the entire period between her work accident and the date she reached 
medical stability. with no reduction for her work and earnings during that 
period.49 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
POINT I. The Commission did not err in determining that the applicable statutes 
did not authorize Employer's use of its Rule 60 (b) Motion to obtain relief 
from Judge Sessions' Order of September 23, 2005. 
A. Neither the applicable statutes nor the Commission's administrative rules 
provide for the use of a 60(b) Motion in workers' compensation proceedings. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that administrative proceedings are not subject to 
the Ut. R. Civ. P. unless the governing statute or regulations so provide. Neither UAPA, 
the Labor Commission Act nor the Worker's Compensation Act, provide that Rule 60(b) 
applies to workers' compensation proceedings. The administrative rules adopted by the 
Commission provide that certain provisions of the Rules are applicable to such proceedings, 
but Rule 60(b) is noticeabh absent. 
B. The Commission's decision is not contrary to any public policy requirement that 
Rule 60(b) relief be applied to its proceedings. 
The Utah Supreme Court has previousl) rejected the assertion that there is an "implied 
public polic}" requiring that Rule 60(b) be applied to worker's compensation proceedings, 
opting instead for the "more pertinent public policy" that the Commission may prescribe its 
own procedural rules and the statutory requirements specifying time periods within which 
AQSupra, note 3 
appeals must be sought. This Court is not the appropriate venue for seeking such statutory, 
or administrative rule, changes. 
C. The Commission's decision is not contrary to the statutory provisions providing 
for motions for reconsideration. 
Motions for reconsideration are regularly considered by the Commission. However, 
they are also subject to statutory time limits and Employer did not timely undertake the 
appropriate actions for seeking a Motion for Reconsideration in this matter. 
D. The Commission's decision is not contrary to the "continuing jurisdiction" 
provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act 
The "continuing jurisdiction" of the Commission is not without limits. Other than for 
correction of mere "clerical errors," the Commission has authority to modify a prior, "final" 
award only if there has been some intervening significant change in circumstances which 
would justify that modification. There was no such significant change in circumstances in 
this case. 
POINT II. Employer failed to properly marshal the evidence. 
An appellant may not select only portions of the material facts to set forth on appeal. 
Rather, an Appellant must basically act as a "devil's advocate," presenting in comprehensive 
and fastidious order every scrap of competent evidence introduced with regard to the case, 
which supports the findings which it now resists. Rather than marshaling all of the evidence 
in support of the Order, Employer has referenced only those facts it deems helpful to its 
appeal. In view of Employer's failure to marshal the evidence, the Court may properly 
assume that the evidence supports the Order. 
POINT III. Employer, even in a trial court setting, would not be permitied to use its 
Rule 60(b) morion as a substitute for a timeh appeal 
Both this Court and our Supreme Court have previous!} declared that Rule 60(b) 
Motions ma) not be based upon Judicial errors of the Court. Otherwise, as those Courts have 
noted. Rule 60(b) would improper!} become a substitute for timeh appeals. The underlying 
Findings of Fact. Conclusions of Law and Order of Judge Sessions, which was the subject 
of the Rule 60(b) Motion, was a final Order of the Commission months before Employer 
filed its Rule 60(b) Motion. That Motion asserts that Judge Sessions made a judicial error 
in awarding temporary total disability benefits at the full rate for the entire period from the 
dare of Employee's injur} until she reached medical stability. If Employer wished to appeal 
that Order, Employer was required to timel} file a Motion for Review within 30 days of the 
date of the Order, which Employer failed to do. Employer may not now7 use Rule 60(b) as 
a substitute for its failure to file a timeh Motion for Review. 
POINT IV. The facts of this case fail to demonstrate any "Mistake, inadvertence, or 
excusable neglect" which, even in a trial court setting, would justify relief 
pursuant to Employer's 60(b) Motion. 
Although the Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law and Order of Judge Sessions in 
the present case was in error, it was not "ambiguous/* The Order clearly set forth the period 
of the award of temporary total disabilit} and the weekly amount awarded for that entire 
period. The pleadings and other documents of record reflected that Employee was seeking 
temporal'} disabilit} benefits for the entire period for which Judge Sessions subsequently 
entered his Order. Judge Sessions Order awarded the benefits for that entire period but failed 
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to make appropriate adjustments to that award for the periods during which Employee was 
able to earn some for light duty work, as the parties had set forth in their prior Stipulation. 
Employer chose to ignore the language of the Order and to contest its liability based on the 
attorney's own evaluation of Employee's claim, without reference to the terms of Judge 
Sessions' Order. Such actions by Employer fail to establish the requisite demonstration of 
any "mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect" which, even in a trial court setting, would 
justify relief under a Rule 60(b) Motion. 
POINT V. The facts of this case, in any event, fail to demonstrate that Judge Sessions 
abused his discretion in denying Employer's Rule 60(b) Motion. 
The standard of review on an appeal from a denial of a Rule 60(b) Motion, even from 
a trial court, is one of abuse of discretion. The standard of review as to factual 
determinations in a Commission Order is, basically, whether that determination was arbitrary, 
capricious, or an abuse of discretion. In this case, Judge Sessions weighed the underlying 
facts and decided that Employer's actions were unot indicative of mistake, inadvertence or 
excusable neglect." When the decision is considered in light of all of the underlying material 
facts and in a light most favorable to Employee, rather than only the isolated facts set forth 
by Employer in a light most favorable to Employer upon which Employer seeks to rely, there 
is no basis for any determination that the Order rejecting Employer's Rule 60(b) Motion was 
arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COMMISSION DID NOT ERR IN DETERMINING THAT THE 
APPLICABLE STATUTES DID NOT AUTHORIZE EMPLOYER'S USE OF ITS 
RULE 60(b) MOTION TO OBTAIN RELIEF FROM JUDGE SESSIONS' ORDER 
OF SEPTEMBER 23, 2005 
A. NEITHER THE APPLICABLE STATUTES NOR THE COMMISSION'S 
ADMINISTRATIVE RULES PROVIDE FOR THE USE OF A 60(b) MOTION 
IN WORKERS' COMPENSATION PROCEEDINGS. 
The Order of the Appeals Board from which Employer appeals, under the heading 
"Discussion and Conclusions of Law/""0 clearly and succinct!}7 sets forth the underlying bases 
for their conclusion that Rule 60(b). Ut. R Civ. P was not applicable to that proceeding. 
In summar\. they reviewed the background and language under UAPA and noted that 
the Commission procedures were subject to UAPA. They also noted that in two areas, 
discovers and default UAPA specifically incorporated the standards adopted in the Utah 
Rules but in others, chose to establish its own procedures. The Appeals Board summarized 
its analysis as follows: 
In simple terms, the foregoing provisions of UAPA, the Labor Commission 
Act and the Workers* Compensation Act establish a comprehensive and 
integrated system that allows the parties to obtain full review and. where 
appropriate, complete relief from any factual or legal error that ma) be 
contained in an ALJ's decision. However, in seeking such relief, the parties 
must follow the procedures created by those statutes, and nothing in UAPA. 
the Labor Commission Act. or the Utah Workers' Compensation Act 
authorizes the use of the procedures found in Rule 60(b) U.R.CJV1 
'°W.at461 
S]lcl at 462 
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The Board's conclusion that Rule 60(b) did not apply to the proceeding before it was 
neither unreasonable, irrational nor contrary to the governing statutes or rules. There is, in 
fact, nothing in UAPA which requires the Commission to adopt Rule 60(b) as part of the 
rules applicable to proceedings before it. Neither is there anything in the Ut. R. Civ. P. 
which does so. 
The Utah Supreme Court has previously confirmed that the Ut. R. Civ. P. do not 
extend to administrative hearings such as that before the Commission, finding that service 
of process for an administrative hearing was not required to be in accordance with those 
Rules^2 and, more recently, that Rule 41 (a) (1) did not apply to administrative matters.33 As 
the Court explained: 
[Administrative proceedings are not subject to the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure unless the governing statute or regulations so provide.54 
In the present case, neither the governing statutes nor Administrative Rules of the 
Commission provided that the Ut. R. Civ. P. applied to this proceeding. The Workers 
Compensation Act specifically exempts the Commission and its administrative and review 
personnel from the application of the provisions of the Ut. R. Civ. P., except as otherwise 
specified in the Act. It provides, instead, that the Commission "shall make rules governing 
52Entre Nous Club v. Toronto, 4 Utah 2d 98, 287 P. 2d 670 (1955) 
53Pilcherv. State Department of Social Services, 663 P. 2d 450 (Utah, 1983). See 
also State Tax Commn v. Iverson, 782 P. 2d 519 (Utah, 1989) 
54M 
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adjudicative procedures.^ That Aci further provides that, except as provided in it or in 
LAP A. "the rules made under this section are not required to conform to common law or 
statuton rules of evidence or other technical rules of procedure."'0 The Act also provides: 
The commission, the commissioner, an administrative lav judge, or the 
Appeals Board, is not bound by the usual common lav or statutory rules of 
evidence, or b) any technical or formal rules or procedure, other than as 
provided in this section or as adopted b} the commission...'7 
In accordance with the statuton provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act and 
UAPA* the Commission has adopted its ow7n rules of procedure. Rather than a wholesale 
incorporation by reference. Administrative Rule R602-2-1 provides for only limited 
incorporation of the Ut R. Ci\. P.D8 Employee submits there is no reference to Rule 60 (b) 
anywhere in those Administrative Rules. 
Instead. Administrative Rule R602-2-KM) provides for the review7 of Orders by 
Administrative Law Judges and specifies that such review must be requested within thirty 
days in accordance with the Motion for Review provisions of Utah Code Anno. §63-46b-12 
and 34A-1-303 (1997). 
In the absence of any adoption of Rule 60(b) in those Administrative Rules, either by 
reference or the use of similar procedural language separate and apart from those under 
"Utah Code Anno. §34A-l-304(l)(a) (1997) 
"Utah Code Anno. §34A-l-304(l)(b) (1997) 
"'Utah Code Anno §34A-2-801(l) (1997) 
v]Supra, note 10 
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Administrative Rule R602-2-l(M), there was no basis for the "Rule 60(b)" review of Judge 
Sessions' Order as sought by Employer. The Commission, therefore, properly dismissed the 
Employer's Motion, long after the Order was final, seeking such a review. 
B. THE COMMISSION'S DECISION IS NOT CONTRARY TO ANY PUBLIC 
POLICY REQUIREMENT THAT RULE 60(b) RELIEF BE APPLIED TO ITS 
PROCEEDINGS 
Employer's contentions that Rule 60(b) should have been incorporated in some 
manner by the Workers' Compensation Act, UAPA or by the Commission rules, does not 
change the fact that it was not. Such arguments are not properly addressed to this Court but, 
rather, should be addressed to the Legislature and/or the Commission's Rulemaking body. 
The Supreme Court has considered a situation very similar to that presently asserted 
by the Employer in its Brief. In Mini Spas, Inc. v. Industrial Commission,59 the Court 
considered an appeal from the law judge's refusal to consider an untimely protest, in which 
the issues as asserted by the appellant were (1) whether the Department abused its discretion 
in refusing to consider the employer's protest to the benefits awarded because the protest was 
not filed within ten days; and (2) whether the administrative law Judge's refusal to consider 
the untimely protest contravenes a claimed public policy to relieve a party of default for 
"mistake" or "excusable neglect" in view of Rule 60 (b)(1). 
The Supreme Court rejected the "implied public policy" arguments based on Rule 
60(b) (1). explaining: 
1987 UT 13, 733 P. 2d 130 (Utah, 1987) 
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It appears to us that the more pertinent public polic} to be applied in this case 
is found in section 35-4-2. section 35-4-10(e) (permitting the Department to 
prescribe its own procedural rules). and sections 35-4-7, -6, and -10 (imposing 
various ten da) filing requirements.)6" 
Similar!}, in the present case, the assertion that there must be some relief similar to 
Rule 60 (b) before the Commission fails to consider that ""more pertinent public policy/' In 
response to the question of what Employer could have done in the present case, the answer 
is relativeh simple. If Employer was unsure of the Order's implications. Employer had the 
option of timeh filing a Motion for Review. 
C. THE COMMISSION'S DECISION IS NOT CONTRARY TO THE 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS PROVIDING FOR MOTIONS FOR 
RECONSIDERATION 
Employer also contends that the Commission's decision is contradicted by Utah Code 
Anno. §63-46b-13 (2001). which specificall} allows for written requests for reconsideration 
with an agency. Motions for Reconsideration of an Order on a Motion for Review are, 
indeed, part of the statutory process available in workers compensation cases.61 and are 
regularly considered b\ the Commission.62 Be that as it may, Employer failed to file any 
Motion for Review, which is the required precursor to a Motion for Reconsideration of a 
Commission decision. 
b[)Id at 132 
^Administrative Ride R602-2-1 (0) [WA request for reconsideration of an Order on 
Motion for Review ma} be allowed and shall be governed by the provisions of Section 63-
46b-13"] 
62See, for instance, the recent case of McCoy v. Utah Disaster Kleenup. 467 Ut. Adv. 
Rep. 23. 2003 UT App. 49 (Utah App.. 2003) 
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Further, if Employer wished its Motion to be treated as a Motion to Reconsider, that 
Motion would have been required to be timely filed in accordance with the provisions for a 
Motion to Reconsider, under Utah Code Anno. §63-46b-13 (2001). That statute requires: 
(1) Within 20 days after the date that an order is issued for which 
review by the agency or by a superior agency under §63-46b-12 is unavailable, 
and if the order would otherwise constitute final agency action, any party may 
file a written request for reconsideration with the agency . . . 
As reflected in its specific terms, that statutory provision has no application where, 
as in the present case, a Motion for Review could have been filed in a timely manner and was 
not "unavailable." Employer's assertions that, as a Motion to Reconsider, its Motion was 
timely filed,63 is not correct since it was not filed within the required twenty day time limit. 
Rather, it was not filed for nearly three months after the Order was issued. 
D. THE COMMISSION'S DECISION IS NOT CONTRARY TO THE 
"CONTINUING JURISDICTION" PROVISIONS OF THE WORKERS 
COMPENSATION ACT 
Employer further contends that the Order of the Appeals Board is contradicted by 
Career Serv. Review Bd. V. Utah Dept. Of Corrections64 Employer asserts that decision 
declares that the Commission has the authority to correct its mistakes, even absent a specific 
statute. Employee submits that case does not stand for that proposition. Rather, as the Court 
explained in its decision, the issue in that case was whether the administrative agency 
retained jurisdiction over a matter after an appeal of the decision has been dismissed and if 
"Employer's Brief, p. 29 
64942P.2d933(Utah, 1997) 
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so. "whether the agency's continuing jurisdiction includes the authority to modiiy its 
previous order on the basis of subsequently discovered facts. "() (emphasis ours) 
That decision was in keeping with numerous other decisions of the Utah courts 
declaring that the Labor Commission can exercise continuing jurisdiction to modifs a prior 
award, but only if there has been some significant change.66 
Paulsen v. Industrial Commission,bl cited by Employer, is also wholly consistent with 
those foregoing decisions in that it requires a "substantial change" in the circumstances in 
order for the Commission to have authority7 to modify a prior final Order. In Paulsen, the 
Commission awarded benefits and found that the Employer did not have insurance and w7as 
insolvent so the Fund paid the benefits. Neither party' sought review. Subsequently, at the 
Fund's request, the Administrative Law Judge amended the aw7ard to state that the Employer 
was liable to reimburse the Fund directly. The Court outlined the effect of the "continuing 
jurisdiction" provisions of the Act as follows: 
We have held that this section gives the Commission broad authority to make 
substantive changes in its orders when substantial changes in the 
circumstances have occurred [citing cases]. We see no reason that section 35-
bVd at 943 
66See Burgess v. Siaperas Sand & Gravel 965 P. 2d 583, 587 (Utah App., 1998) 
["The basis for reopening a claim is provided by w evidence of some significant change or new 
development in the claimant's injur} or proof of the previous awrard*s inadequacy."]; Ortega 
v. Meadow Valley Construction. 2000 UT 24. 996 P. 2d 1039 (Utah, 2000) ["(T)he 
Commission's exercise of its continuing jurisdiction requires "evidence of some significant 
change or new development in the claimant"s injur}' or proof of the previous award's 
inadequacy."] 
770 P. 2d 125 (Utah. 1989) 
1-78 should not also be construed to permit mere clerical changes in the 
Commission's orders * * * 
The next question is whether the amendment obtained by the Fund was one 
correcting a clerical error. We think it was. Again, useful analogy may be 
made to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60 (a), which addresses the power of 
trial courts to correct clerical errors. Under that rule, we have drawn a 
distinction between "clerical errors," which a court may correct, and "judicial 
errors,' which it may not. A clerical error is one made in recording a judgment 
that results in the entry of a judgment which does not conform to the actual 
intention of the court. On the other hand, a judicial error is one made in 
rendering the judgment and results in a substantively incorrect judgment, 
[citing cases]68 (emphasis ours). 
As reflected in the foregoing language, and contrary to the assertions of Employer, 
Paulsen does not declare that "[t]he Commission's authority to make substantive changes, 
which is also undisputed, is comparable to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), and allowed 
in administrative proceedings."69 To the contrary, Paulsen clarifies the fact that the 
Commission is without authority to amend final Orders, other than for mere '"clerical errors," 
where no "'substantial change" is demonstrated. 
Employee submits that Employer has failed to demonstrate any "substantial change" 
to justify the correction sought to Judge Sessions' Order of September 23, 2005 and that 
Employer has failed to meet its burden of establishing that the Appeals Board erred in 
determining that the Employer's use of a Rule 60(b) Motion was not proper. Such Motions 
are not available in workers' compensation proceedings before the Labor Commission and 
no "clerical" error or change of circumstances was demonstrated. 
6
*Id. at 130 
69Employer's Brief, p. 26 
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POINT II 
EMPLOYER FAILED TO PROPERLY MARSHALL THE EVIDENCE 
Am appeal from Labor Commission matters is general!) high]} fact dependent. Since 
Employer's Brief asserts that the Commission improperh denied its Rule 60 (b) motion, and 
since the standard of review of an) Judge denying a Rule 60 (b) Motion is an "'abuse of 
discretion" standard.70 it is vital that Employer full} and complete!) set forth all of the 
material facts upon which the Order ma) have been based, so that all of those relevant facts 
ma} be properly considered by this Court. 
Employer has the duty7, in such situations, to carefull) and properly "marshal*" the 
evidence before the Commission. The) ma) not select onl) portions of the material facts to 
set forth, or set forth only those facts which reflect their claims in the most favorable light. 
Rather, the} must basically act as a ""devil's advocate." presenting, "in comprehensive and 
fastidious order, ever)7 scrap of competent evidence introduced" with regard to that motion 
"which supports the very findings the appellant resists."71 
Marshaling the evidence on an appeal is a process fundamental^ different from that 
of presenting their claims at the hearing. As the Utah Supreme Court recently explained in 
Chen, 2 in a recent, extensive attempt to reiterate the requirements of marshaling: 
Appellants cannot mere]} present carefully selected facts and excerpts from the 
record in support of their position [citing cases] Nor can they simply restate 
™Supra, note 9 
11
 West Valley v. Majestic Im\ Co., 818 P. 2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App., 1991) 
T
-Chen v. Stewart. 2004 UT 82, 100 P. 3d 1177 (Utah. 2004) 
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or review evidence that points to an alternate finding or a finding contrary to 
the trial court's finding of fact [citing cases] Furthermore, appellants cannot 
shift the burden of marshaling by falsely claiming that there is no evidence in 
support of the trial court's findings.73 
The Court went on to emphasize that, "If the marshaling requirement is not met, the 
appellate court has grounds to affirm the court's findings on that basis alone" and "we 
assume that the evidence supports the trial court's findings."74 
Rather than marshaling all the evidence in support of the Order, as mandated, 
Employer has referenced only some of the relevant facts and has referenced the facts from 
its own point of view. Employee has been required, therefore, to extensively supplement the 
facts asserted by Employer in an attempt to place all of the relevant facts before the Court. 
When all of the material facts are considered, it becomes clearer that this case does 
not involve some 'intentional misinterpretation" of an "ambiguous" Order by Employee's 
counsel and the Appeals Board, as Employer would have the Court believe. Rather, it 
involves an Order in which Judge Sessions awarded temporary total disability benefits to 
Employee for the entire period from the date of her injury through the date she reached 
medical stability, as Employee had requested, but in which he failed to including the 
appropriate adjustments for the amounts she was able to earn while engaged in light duty 
work during that period as detailed in paragraph 12 of the Stipulation of the parties. The 
material facts further demonstrate that Judge Sessions' error could readily and timely been 
73
 Id at 1195 
74Id at 1196. See also Merriamv. Industrial Comm'n, 812 P. 2d 447,450 (Utah App., 
1991) and Feather stone v. Industrial Comm % 877 P. 2d 1251, 1254 (Utah App., 1994) 
1 0 
resolved b) Employei through a limeh Motion for Review to the Labor Commission As 
with an} other Judgment, when no appeal was timeh taken, the Order and the judicial error 
included in it became final. 
POINT III 
EMPLOYER, EVEN IN A TRIAL COURT SETTING, WOULD 
NOT BE PERMITTED TO USE ITS RULE 60(b) MOTION 
AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR A TIMELY APPEAL 
When an appeal is taken from a denial of a Rule 60(b) motion, the onl) issue properly 
before the court is the propriety of the denial of that motion. As this Court stated Franklin 
Covey Client Sales v. Melvin. "Appellate review of Rule 60(b) Orders must be narrowed in 
this manner lest Rule 60(b) become a substitute for timely appeals."75 
For that same reason. Rule 60(b) Motions based upon Judicial errors of the Court are 
not permitted. In Franklin Covey, this Court affirmed the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion 
which was based upon MelvhTs assertions that the trial court made a mistake in its adoption 
of findings of fact which were insufficient to support its conclusions of law. The Court 
explained that wrongl) deciding a point of lav* is not such "mistake, inadvertence, surprise 
or excusable neglect" as would sustain a Rule 60(b) motion: 
In sum, Melvin has not even attempted to present "mistakes' for which relief 
may be obtained under Rule 60(b)( 1). Instead, having missed the deadline for 
appealing the summary judgment and declarator} judgment order, he attempts 
to enter the "back door* to the merits of the case b) appealing the denial of his 
Rule 60(b) motions. We reject Melvin*s attempt to present for our review 
issues that would onh have been properl) before us on a direct, timely appeal 
from the summary judgment and the resulting declarator}7 judgment order.76 
^Franklin Covey. Supra, note 9. at ^ 19 
16Id at TI25 
Utah's Supreme Court has also confirmed that Rule 60(b) is not an appropriate means 
of correcting a judicial error in a judgment. In Fisher v. Bybee,11 the Court considered a 
denial of a Rule 60(b) (1) motion which alleged that a judgment was based on a mistaken 
application of the law. The Court affirmed the denial explaining: 
Mr. Bybee maintains that Judge Harding mistakenly interpreted section 78-12-22 of 
the Utah Code when he entered a renewed judgment against him initiated by motion, 
not a new lawsuit. While the trial court agreed with Mr. Bybee that the debtor 
judgment should not have been renewed based on Fishers' motion, it did not void the 
judgment under rule 60(b)(1), holding that rule 60(b)(1) was proper to remedy only 
a clerical mistake, not a major judicial misapprehension of the law. We agree with 
the trial Court.78 
In Lange v. Eby,79 the Supreme Court again considered the appeal from a trial court's 
denial of a rule 60(b) motion in which Eby claimed he was entitled to be credited with 
amounts from a prior settlement and sought to have the Court set aside the Judgment until 
his motion to be credited could be determined. The lower Court denied both motions and 
Eby appealed. On appeal, Eby attempted to argue that his Rule 60(b) motion was wrongly 
denied, as well as his motion to be credited with the settlement. The Court limited Eby's 
appeal to ^challenging the grounds for denial of the rule 60(b) motion" on the basis that the 
Court lacked jurisdiction over his appeal of the Judgment as the time for an appeal had run. 
Eby then contended that "he is entitled to relief from the judgment because the trial court 
wrongly denied him relief under rule 60(b) by not crediting him with the Geary settlement 
11512 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 2004 UT 92 (Utah, 2004) 
nId. at T|9 
792006UTApp. 118, 133 P. 3d 451 (Utah App., 2006) 
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under Viah Code Anno §15-4-3/" The Court rejected that argument and aflirmed the trial 
Court's denial of the Rule 60(b) Motion, explaining: 
We agree with Lange that Eh) cannot raise the merits of his argument that he 
should be credited the settlement amount because it is not within the scope of 
his appeal from the denial of his rule 60(b) motion. We have previoush held 
that a rule 60(b) motion is not the appropriate means to raise a mistake of law. 
See id. at Para. 21 [Franklin Covey Client Sales v. Melvin. 2000 UT App 110. 
Para. 9, 2 P. 3d 451] Cw[A]n appeal or motion for a new trial rather than a 
[Rule] 60 (b) motion, is the proper avenue to redress mistakes of law 
committed by the trial judge") (alterations in original) (quotations and citations 
omitted)). Moreover, although this court analyzed rule 60(b)91). we also noted 
more generalh that an appeal from a 60(b) motion "'does not. at least in most 
cases, reach the merits of the underlying judgment from which relief was 
sought."" Id. at para 19 (quoting 12 James Wm. Moore, et aL Moore's 
Federal Practice §60.68[3] (3d ed. 1999)). A rule 60(b) motion cannot wtbe 
used as a 'back door' to a direct appeal of the underlying [motions]/' Id at 
Para. 23. Instead, we must narrow an appeal of a rule 60(b) order to the denial 
or grant of relief so that it does not "'become a substitute for timely appeals/" 
Id. at Para. 19 (quoting Moore et aL supra. §60.68[3]). 
The Utah Supreme Court endorsed the reasoning of Franklin Covey in Fisher 
v. Bybee. 2004 UT 92.104 P. 3d 1198. and "categorically removed legal error 
from the realm of mistakes recognized under rule 60(b)( 1 )/* Id. at Para. 11. 
The Fisher decision noted that Franklin Cove)' cited Moore s Federal Practice 
in explaining "'the rationale for a restrictive rule 60(b) review. Id. at Para. 10; 
see also Moore et aL, supra. §60.68[3]. Eby attempts to avoid the mandate of 
Fisher and Franklin Covey by characterizing his motion as being brought 
under rule 60(b)(4). (5), and (6), not just rule 60(b)(1). 
However, the essence of Eby's argument is that the trial court committed legal 
error in not crediting him with settlement, resulting in a void, unfair, and/or 
inequitable judgment. Moore's treatise, as concurred in b\ both ihe Fisher and 
Franklin Covey opinions, makes clear that all rule 60(b) motions attacking the 
legality of a trial court ruling are substitutes for timeh appeals and will not 
succeed. See Moore et aL, supra. §60.68[3].80 
7tf.,at1J7 
As reflected in its extensive arguments in its Brief, Employer in the present case is 
attempting to assert in its appeal that its Rule 60(b) motion was improvidently denied because 
of Judge Sessions' judicial error in making an award to Employee which was not in 
accordance with the Stipulation of the parties. As reflected in the foregoing decisions, this 
Court should properly affirm the dismissal of that Rule 60(b) Motion, even if it should find 
that Rule 60(b) motions are generally applicable to workers' compensation proceedings. 
Such action is mandated in accordance with the Court's previous declaration that, uRule 
60(b) motions attacking the legality of a trial court ruling are substitutes for timely appeals 
and will not succeed."81 
POINT IV 
THE FACTS OF THIS CASE FAIL TO DEMONSTRATE ANY 
"MISTAKE, INADVERTENCE OR EXCUSABLE NEGLECT" WHICH, 
EVEN IN A TRIAL COURT SETTING, WOULD JUSTIFY RELIEF 
PURSUANT TO EMPLOYER'S 60(B) MOTION 
Employee certainly recognizes that Judge Sessions' Order of September 23,2005, was 
erroneous. However, that Order was not "ambiguous" as claimed by Employer, particularly 
when considered together with the Medical Panel Report and Stipulation of the Parties which 
were incorporated into it. The Appeals Board had no difficulty in interpreting that Order as 
awarding disability benefits at $487.00 per week for the entire period from the date of the 
Employee's accident (March 18, 1999) to the date she reached medical stability (June 10. 
{Id. 
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2004)K2 and neither did Employee's Counsel.8' If Employer found the Order to be 
ambiguous, as il claims, it had a read} remed) of seeking a Motion for Review to correct that 
alleged "ambiguity." Rather, as noted by the Commission, the Employer chose to ignore that 
alleged "ambiguit\" and to contest its liability under the Order "based on the attorney's own 
evaluation of Ms. Clausing's claim and without reference to the terms of Judge Session's 
decision."84 
Despite Employer's protests to the contrary. Employer either knew, or reasonably 
should have known, prior to the issuance of Judge Session's Order, that Employee was 
seeking an award of temporary disability for the periods set forth in the Court's Order. 
Employee's Application specified that she wras seeking temporary partial disability benefits 
together with temporary' total disability benefits, for the periods of time she was unable to 
work due to her injuries and treatments.8- Employee's Pre-hearing Disclosures indicated she 
w7as seeking such benefits and noted, wwWe believe that the full payment of TTD and TPD was 
not paid after the various knee surgeries. However, there does not seem to be any dispute 
regarding the dates and we hope to have this issue resolved before the hearing."86 The 
parties did. in fact, resolve those disputes regarding the dates and they were incorporated in 
nSupra* note 3 
^Employee's Statement of Facts No. 22 
uId at 461 
^Employee's Statement of Facts No. 21 
86Employee's Statement of Facts No. 4 
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paragraph 12 of the Stipulation. Paragraph 12 specifically set forth the various dates, from 
the date of Employee's work related injury on March 18, 1999 through the date of the 
Stipulation, when Employee was able to work in a light duty capacity, as well as the various 
earnings she had for those dates. It further specified that the Stipulation was executed on 
September 15, 2004 and that "temporary total or temporary partial disability thereafter will 
need to be addressed at a later date."88 The medical panel determined that Employee did not 
reach medical stability until June 10,2004, when Dr. Morgan indicated uhe had nothing else 
to offer and her condition had not changed."89 
Judge Sessions did not consider the late filing of the Objection to the medical panel 
report filed by Employer. Therefore, the Judge did not consider Employee's Response. 
However, Employer still received that Response in which Employee once again indicated that 
temporary total and temporary partial disability benefits had not been paid correctly, as 
reflected on the income chart at paragraph 12 of the Stipulation, and that, therefore, 
Employee was requesting "an order for Temporary Total Disability/Temporary Partial 
Disability through MMI of June 10, 2004, less amounts actually paid, plus 8% interest.'"90 
At that point, Employer was also deemed to know the Statutes which provided for 
temporary total and temporary partial disability benefits for the Employee based upon her 
87Employee*s Statement of Facts Nos. 5 and 3 
88Employee's Statement of Facts No. 3 
89Employee's Statement of Facts No. 6 
90Employee's Statement of Facts No. 8 
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abiiin to engage in light dut\ work during the period of thai disabilitx as reflected at 
paragraph 12 of the Stipulation.91 
Given all of the foregoing documentation and information. Employer must be deemed 
to have known, or at least certainh should have known, upon receipt that Judge Session's 
Order had awarded Employee Temporary Total Disability benefits for the entire period from 
the date of her work related injun on March 18, 1999 through the date she reached medical 
stability on June 10. 2004, at the rate of $487.00 per week92, which is a total of $126.814.34 
(after deduction of the $6,136.60 previoush paid). Accumulated interest had accrued at 8% 
per annum from the dates those payments were due. amounting to an additional $56,747.51 
through December 15. 2005. for a total through that date of $183.561.85.93 
The Appeals Board of the Labor Commission readih understood the clear meaning 
of that Order94 as being precisely the same thing understood b) Employee and her attorney. 
The Appeals Board and the Employee and her attorney similarly understood that the Order 
embodied a legal error as it did not appl} appropriate adjustments to the award for the various 
times during the period of the award when Employee was able to engage in light duly work, 
as specified in paragraph 12 of the Stipulation which was incorporated in the Order. 
^'Employee's Statement of Facts No. 9 
92Judge Sessions' Order, Supra, note 11 and Appeals Board Order, Supra, note 3 
93Supra, note 25 
q4Supra, note 3 
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Employer knew, or should have known, from reading that Order that the foregoing 
award had been made to Employer by reason of that Order. Employer either also knew, or 
reasonably should have known, that Order was not correct and embodied that legal error 
previously discussed. 
If Employer did not understand, for whatever reason, the plain meaning of that Order, 
and believed that the Order was ambiguous, Employer's obligation remained the same. As 
specified in that Order, the Employer had 30 days within which to file an appropriate Motion 
for Review with the Commission or the Appeals Board. Instead, Employer inappropriately 
chose not to file any such Motion and yet still refused to pay the award. 
As reflected in Employee's Statement of Facts, Employee recognized that the Order 
was in error and attempted to contact Employer's counsel. Beginning within two weeks after 
entry of the Order. Employee's attorney attempted to call Employer's attorneys and left 
messages regarding payment of the compensation, but Employer's attorneys did not return 
her calls. Despite those attempts, it was neither Employee's duty, nor was it appropriate, for 
her to file a Motion to Review to secure a correction for the benefit of the Employer. 
On December 1,2005, Employee's counsel finally got through to one of Employer's 
other attorneys and willingly offered to accept the $123,061.20 which should have been 
awarded by the Court, taking into consideration the offsets referenced in paragraph 12 of the 
Stipulation, even though Employer had failed to file a Motion for Review. She followed that 
with her letter dated December 1, 2005, in which she confirmed that offer and attached 
-40-
computations of that offer as well as the computations of the award as set forth in the Judge's 
Order/" 
As the Commission noted. Employer's offer was rejected b} Employer's counsel 
based on the attorn e> \s own eA aluation of Ms. Clausing's claim and without reference to the 
terms of Judge Session's decision.% After rejecting that demand. Employer still took no 
action to challenge the decision or to pa} Employee benefits. 
Onl) after the Employee finally requested, on December 20.2005, the issuance of an 
Abstract of the Award, to allow her to seek to enforce the award in Court, did the Employer 
bother to seek its tawRule 60(b)" relief.97 
As reflected in prior decisions of the Utah's Courts, with regard to a movant's 
obligations under a Rule 60(b) (1) Motion. "We have heretofore defined ''excusable neglect" 
as the exercise of "due diligence" by a reasonably prudent person under similar 
circumstances. 
The Court in Mini Spas, specifically considered issues on appeal which were similar 
to those asserted b} Employer throughout its brief, with regard to Rule 60 (b)(1), to-wit: 
(1) whether the Department abused its discretion in refusing to consider the 
employer's protest to the benefits awarded because the protest was not filed 
within ten days; and (2) whether the administrative law Judge's refusal to 
^Employee's Statement of Facts Nos. 10. 13 
^Employee's Statement of Facts No. 14 
Employee's Findings of Fact Nos. 15, 16, 17 
%M/7/ Spas, Supra, note 59. at 131. See also Airkcm Intermountain v. Parker, 30 
Utah 2d 65, 513 P. 2d 429 (Utah, 1973) 
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consider the untimely protest contravenes a claimed public policy to relieve a 
party of default for "mistake" or 'excusable neglect'99 
The Court, however, rejected the "'implied public policy" arguments based on Rule 
60(b) (1), explaining: 
It appears to us that the more pertinent public policy to be applied in this case 
is found in section 35-4-2, section 35-4-10(e) (permitting the Department to 
prescribe its own procedural rules), and sections 35-4-7. -6, and -10 (imposing 
various ten day filing requirements. 
The Court therefore affirmed the decision of the Board, indicating that those 
arguments were "without merit" and that: 
[T]he undisputed facts here do not support any claim that the employer 
diligently acted in a reasonably prudent manner in failing to file its response 
until three weeks after it was due. With knowledge that the notice was 
forthcoming and a response was necessary, the employer's neglect or mistake 
was not excusable.100 
In Airkem101. the Court similarly refused to overturn the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion 
by the trial court, where the judgment was entered against a defendant who failed to appear 
in person or through counsel at the trial, alleging that his attorney had not been able to 
contact him because he was employed in an adjoining county and gone from early in the 
morning until late at night, and his wife was ill and had been in a hospital for several months. 
The Court noted, however: 
In the instant action, defendant was informed in February that the matter would 
probably be set for trial in early autumn; he also knew of the irregular hours 
"Mini Spas, Id. at 130 
100M at 132 
mSupra, note 97 
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during which he was present in his home. His failure to contact his counsel 
under such circumstances from Februan to September 21 could reasonably be 
considered as not constituting due diligence b} the trial court. Defense counsel 
was informed in earl} Ma} of the trial setting in September, his belated efforts 
ten days prior to trial to contact his client, particular!} when there is no 
allegation as to the means of communication utilized, might reasonabh be 
considered as not indicating due diligence. Since defendant's conduct was not 
entireh inexcusable, the trial court did not abuse its discretion b} refusing to 
relieve defendant of the judgment.102 
Employee submits that the actions of Employer and its counsel as previously outlined 
and as considered b} Judge Sessions, come far short of am exercise of "due diligence" by 
a reasonabh prudent person. Such actions ma} arguabh be claimed to have been due to 
"oversight or negligence" but they were not such as to constitute "excusable negligence." 
In an} event, it was not an abuse of discretion by Judge Sessions to determine that such 
actions did not comport with *"due diligence" or constitute "excusable neglect." 
Under such circumstances. Employer should not no\* be heard to complain that 
"public policy" somehow demands that Employer be provided with additional equitable 
remedies to correct the judicial error of Judge Sessions, even beyond what would be allowed 
if Rule 60(b) had been "cognizable" in this proceeding. 
The Appeals Board of the Labor Commission in the present case properly looked to 
the provisions of UAPA* the Labor Commission Act. and the LItah Workers' Compensation 
Act. along with its own Rules, and determined that the Employer had a remed} readily 
available in that it could have timel} filed a Motion for Review. As the Board explained: 
]02ld at 431 
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This review procedure is well known to attorneys practicing before the Labor 
Commission. It is simple and inexpensive. It does, however, require that 
parties carefully read and evaluation the ALJs" decisions within the 30-day 
period permitted for filing requests for review. In this case, because Frito-Lay 
never requested review of Judge Sessions' decision, it waived its opportunity 
to request correction.103 
Finally, Employer asserts that the "discovery rule" should somehow be applied as in 
in a fraud case, because ''Clausing did not make her unjustified demand based on her 
admitted misinterpretation of the Order until December 1, 2005"104 and "Clausing's 
interpretation of the Order, which she admits is contrary to the evidence, was concealed until 
December 1, 2005."1(b There is absolutely no support in the record for those outlandish 
claims. Further, those assertions ignore Employer's own obligations and duty to know and 
understand the terms of the Order, which it could certainly do as readily as Employee and the 
Appeals Board could. The record establishes that Employer knew or reasonably should have 
known of the judicial error when the Order was received. There is, therefore, no basis for 
the application of a different filing deadline for a Motion for Review through the application 
of the "discovery rule." 
Appropriate review procedures were available for relief from the judicial error 
contained in Judge Session's Order. As the Appeals Board explained, those procedures 
required that the Employer "carefully read and evaluate the ALJ's decisions within the 30-
]03Supra9 note 3, at 462 
104Employer's Brief, p. 29 
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da} period permitted for filing request for review ."!06 The failure to do so does not constitute 
"excusable negligence" within the terms of Rule 60(b). Neither does it justify the application 
of a "discovery rule" to start the 30-da\ appeal period running onh when the attorne) finally 
realizes that there is an error in the Order. 
It should also be noted that, when reviewing an agency's interpretation of its own 
rules, the Court applies an "intermediate standard of review, deferring to an agency's 
interpretation as long as it is both reasonable and rational."107 Given all of the underlying 
facts of this case, the Commission was neither unreasonable nor irrational in declaring: 
Because Frito-Lay's purported Rule 60(b) Motion was not cognizable in this 
workers' compensation proceeding. Judge Sessions* decision addressing the 
merits of the Rule 60(b) motion is a nullity. 
POINT V 
THE FACTS OF THIS CASE, IN ANY EVENT, FAIL TO 
DEMONSTRATE THAT JUDGE SESSIONS ABUSED HIS 
DISCRETION IN DENYING EMPLOYER'S RULE 60(b) MOTION 
The Standard of Review on appeal of a trial court's denial of a Rule 60(b) Motion is 
one of "abuse of discretion/* As this Court has previously explained: 
A trial court has discretion in determining whether a movant has shown [Rule 
60(b) grounds], and this Court will reverse the trial court's ruling only when 
there has been an abuse of discretion.108 
* Supra, note 3 at 462 
)n
 Barnard & Burk, Supra, note 7. at 703 
* Jensen* Supra, note 9 
Judge Session's Amended Order Denying Rule 60(b) Motion reflects that he fully 
considered the allegations of the Employer in seeking that Motion and determined that the 
facts, taken as a whole, demonstrated insufficient grounds for ''mistake, surprise, or 
excusable neglect" adequate to justify the imposition of Rule 60(b) relief. His findings 
included a determination that: 
Respondent failed to return telephone calls to Petitioner's counsel and grossly 
neglected to request relief from the order by way of appeal within the 30 days 
allowed by law and rule for such relief if he in fact was confused by the 
amended order itself.109 
Judge Sessions further concluded that the actions of the Employer are "not indicative 
of mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect. It would be unjust to set the amended order 
aside under the facts of this case."110 
Rule 60(b), after all, does not justify relief for "neglect" but, rather, only for 
'"excusable neglect." As the Court has previously explained, "We have heretofore defined 
"excusable neglect' as the exercise of 'due diligence' by a reasonably prudent person under 
similar circumstances."111 
Employer has wholly failed to demonstrate that Judge Sessions' actions in denying 
Employer's Rule 60(b) Motion were arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion, 
particularly when all of the relevant facts are considered in a light most favorable to Judge 
Session's Order. Judge Sessions had the full history of Employer's actions, or want of 
,09%?ra,notel8, at 335 
mId 
U]
 Supra, note 59 
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actions, before him as previous!) set forth in Employee's Statement of Facts and as discussed 
more full} in Point IV. Judge Sessions failure 10 find "excusable negligence" under such 
circumstances was neither arbitral"}, capricious, nor an abuse of discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should affirm the Order of the Appeals Board of the Labor Commission 
and its dismissal of Employer's Rule 60(b) Motion. Should the Court determine that the 
Appeals Board improper!} determined thai Rule 60(b) did not apply to this proceeding, the 
Court may still affirm the Order of the Appeals Board to the extent it determined. "Judge 
Sessions" decision of September 23, 2005 is final and remains in effect." This Court has 
previously declared that an appellate court ma)' affirm a judgment appealed from if it is 
sustainable on an} legal ground or theor} apparent on the record, even though that legal 
ground or theor}7 differs from that stated by the trial court to the be basis of the ruling or 
action.112 In the present case, as previously reflected, the relevant facts establish that Judge 
Session's Order denying Employer's Rule 60(b) Motion was not arbitrary7, capricious, or an 
abuse of discretion and that his Order of September 23. 2005 should remain final and in 
effect. It would, therefore, be appropriate for this Court to affirm the Appeal Board's Order, 
even if it determines that Rule 60(b) does apply to this proceeding, leaving Judge Session's 
Amended Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law and Order to Correct Benefit Computation 
Omission, dated September 23. 2005. in place. 
1 ]2Jvie v. Hickman. 2004 UT App 469, ^|8. n. 3, 105 P. 3d 946 (Utah App., 2004). See 
also Barnard & Burk Supra, note 7 at n. 6 
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Respectfully Submitted this / (s day of April, 2007 i  /a 
A 
By: 
Gary E.Atkin,SB# 0144 
K. Dawn Atkin, SB# 
Attorneys for Employee, Amy C. Clausing 
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ADDENDUM 
NO. 1 
UT\R L^BOR COMMISSION 
ADJUDICATION DIVISION 
POBox 146b 15 
Sail Lake City, Utah 84114-0615 
801-530-oSOO 
0ft ZACHER-CLAUSING, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
FRITO LAY, 
Respondent. 
AMENDED 
ORDER DENYING RULE 60(b) 
MOTION FILED BY RESPONDENT AND 
DENYING RECONSIDERATION OF THE 
ORDER 
Case No. 2003892 
Judge Dale W Sessions 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE CASE 
The ALJ issued a final order in this case dated August 23, 2005. The Order was 
.Amended and re-issued September 23, 2005. Copies of the decision were mailed to all parties. 
No timely appeal was filed in this case. The Ruling became the final order of the Labor 
Commission because no appeal was m fact filed. On December 21, 2005. Respondent filed a 
motion entitled "RULE 60(b) MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT." On January 3, 
2006, Petitioner filed an opposition to the motion. On January 13, 2006, a Reply was filed by 
Respondent. On January 17, 2006 Respondent filed a pleading entitled "SUPPLEMENTAL 
FILING IN SUPPORT OF RULE 60(b) MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT." On 
January 23, 2006 Petitioner countered that filing with a Motion to STRIKE SUPPLEMENTAL 
FILING February 6, 2006 Respondent filed a MEMORANDUM FN OPPOSITION TO 
MOTION TO STRIKE SUPLEMENTAL FILING. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1 It is undisputed that the amended final order in this case was entered September 
23,2005. 
2 It is undisputed that no appeal was filed within the 30 days following the amended 
final order. 
3 It is undisputed that Respondent filed a Rule 60(b) motion on December 21, 2005. 
This filing was the 90th day past the entry of the final order. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Respondent asks the ALJ to set aside the amended order of September 23, 2005 on the 
founds of mistake, surprise and excusable neglect pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 60(b)(1). 
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Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) contains the following language: 
ui
. . . On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the flirtherance of 
justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or 
proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable 
neglect. . . . [F]or reasons [contained in] (1 ) . . . the motion shall be made not more 
than 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken." 
Respondent filed his motion 90 days after the entry of the final order. However, 
spondent has failed to make his case out for the relief requested in that insufficient grounds for 
stake, surprise or excusable neglect exists. Respondent failed to return telephone calls to 
titioner's counsel and grossly neglected to request relief from the order by way of appeal 
thin the 30 days allowed by law and rule for such relief if he in fact was confused by the 
lended order itself. 
Given the history of the attempts to communicate between counsel after the order 
sued, and the fact that Respondent waited too long to file an appeal, it would be unjust for the 
der to be set aside at this time. If Respondent was truly confused, his efforts should have 
cused on clearing that confusion by way of motion for review within the appropriate period 
stead of trying to rescue the delay by this method. In addition, Respondent advances the 
fidavit of Andrew Wadsworth which demonstrates that Respondent intended to dispute the 
aimed amount, but only announced that to Counsel for Petitioner on December 1, 2005, a 
sriod still beyond the appeal period. Then, some 20 days later Respondent filed the current 
lotion. This is not indicative of mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect. It would be unjust 
) set the amended order aside under the facts of this case. 
Because it would be unjust to set aside the amended order under the circumstances of 
lis case, and because the proof as grounds for the motion is inadequate the motion to set aside 
nder URCP 60(b) must be denied. 
Utah Administrative Procedures Act (hereinafter UAPA) provisions establish that an 
ggrieved party may file for agency review of a final order by filing a written request for review 
vithin 30 days after the issuance of the order. Utah Code Ann., §63-46b-12(l) et seq. Petitioner 
ailed to exercise the timely appeal right for this case. 
UAPA provisions also discuss obtaining relief from an order by having an order set 
teide. However, the statute only addresses relief from a default order and the order in this case 
^as not a default order. See Utah Code Ann., §63-46b-ll. These provisions do not rescue a 
-ase where a final order has entered which is not a default order. 
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Because no appeal was taken, and because the motion for relief from judgment was 
led without sufficient grounds made out as required in Rule 60, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
s outlined above, the Rule 60(b) Motion For Relief From Judgment must be denied 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED- that the Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief from 
udspient filed by Respondent is demed. 
DATED THIS March 17, 2006. 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
Dale W Sessions 
Administrative Law Judge 
NOTICE OF APPEAL PJGHTS 
A party aggrieved by the decision may file a Motion for Review7 with the Adjudication 
Division of the Utah Labor Commission. The Motion for Review must set forth the specific 
basis for review and must be received by the Commission within 30 days from the date this 
decision is signed. Other parties may then submit their responses to the Motion for Review 
within 20 days of the date of the Motion for Review. 
Any party may request that the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission conduct 
the foregoing review. Such request must be included in the party's Motion for Review or its 
response. If none of the parties specifically request review by the Appeals Board, the review will 
be conducted by the Utah Labor Commission. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the attached Order was mailed by prepaid U.S. 
Postage on March 17, 2006, to the persons/parties at the following addresses: 
Amy Zacher-Clausmg 
!322 Sonata St 
Salt Lake City UT 84116 
Frito Lay 
6301 W 4700 S 
Reams UT 84118 
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ADDENDUM 
NO. 2 
R.602-2. Labor Commission, Adjudication. 
R602-2. Adjudication of Workers1 Compensation and Occupational 
Disease Claims. 
R602-2-1. Pleadings and Discovery. 
A. Definitions. 
1. "Commission" means the Labor Commission. 
2. "Division" means the Division of Adjudication within 
the Labor Commission. 
3. "Application for Hearing" means the request for agency 
action regarding a workers' compensation claim. 
4. "Supporting medical documentation" means a Summary of 
Medical Record or other medical report or treatment note 
completed by a physician that indicates the presence or absence 
of a medical causal connection between benefits sought and the 
alleged industrial injury. 
5. ''Authorization to Release Medical Records7' is a form 
authorizing the injured workers' medical providers to provide 
medical records and other medical information to the commission 
or a party. 
6. "Supporting documents" means supporting medical 
documentation, list of medical providers, Authorization to 
Release Medical Records and, when applicable; an Appointment of 
Counsel form. 
7. "Petitioner" means the person or entity who has filed 
an .Application for Hearing. 
8. "Respondent" means the person or entity against whom 
the Application for Hearing was filed. 
9. "Discovery motion" includes a motion to compel or a 
motion for protective order. 
B. Application for Hearing. 
1. Whenever a claim for compensation benefits is denied by 
an employer or insurance carrier, the burden rests on the injured 
workers, or medical provider, to initiate agency action by filing 
an Application for Hearing with the Division. Applications for 
hearing shall include an original, notarized Authorization to 
Release Medical Records. 
2. An employer or insurance carrier, or any other party 
with standing under the Workers' Compensation Act may obtain a 
hearing before the Adjudication Division by filing a request for 
agency action with the Division. 
3. All Applications for Hearing shall include any 
available supporting medical documentation of the claim where 
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there is a dispute over medical issues. Applications for Hearing 
without supporting documentation and a properly completed 
Authorization to Release Medical Records may not be mailed to the 
employer or insurance carrier for answer until the appropriate 
documents have been provided. In addition to respondent's 
answer, a respondent may file a motion to dismiss the Application 
for Hearing where there is no supporting medical documentation 
filed to demonstrate medical causation when such is at issued 
between the parties. 
4. When an Application for Hearing with appropriate 
supporting documentation is filed with the Division, the Division 
shall forthwith mail to the respondents a copy of the Application 
for Hearing, supporting documents and Notice of Formal 
Adjudication and Order for Answer. 
5. In cases where the injured worker is represented by an 
aittorney, a completed and signed Appointment of Counsel form 
shall be filed with the Application for Hearing or upon retention 
of the attorney. 
C. Answer. 
1. The respondent (s) shall have 3 0 days from the date of 
mailing of the Order for Answer, to file a written answer to the 
Application for Hearing. 
2. The answer shall admit or deny liability for the claim 
and shall state the reasons liability is denied. The answer 
shall state all affirmative defenses with sufficient accuracy and 
detail that the petitioner and the division may be fully informed 
of the nature and substance of the defenses asserted. 
3. All answers shall include a summary of benefits which 
have been paid to date on the claim, designating such payments by 
category, i.e. medical expenses, temporary total disability, 
permanent partial disability, etc. 
4. When liability is denied based upon medical issues, 
copies of all available medical reports sufficient to support the 
denial of liability shall be filed with the answer. 
5. If the answer filed by the respondents fails to 
sufficiently explain the basis of the denial, fails to include 
available medical reports or records to support the denial, or 
contains affirmative defenses without sufficient factual detail 
to support the affirmative defense, the Division may strike the 
answer filed and order the respondent to file within 20 days, a 
new answer which conforms with the requirements of this rule. 
6. All answers must state whether the respondent is 
willing to medicate the claim. 
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7. Petitioners are allowed to timely amend the Application 
for Hearing, and respondents are allowed to timely amend the 
answer, as newly discovered information becomes available that 
would warrant the amendment. The parties shall not amend their 
pleading later than 4 5 days prior to the scheduled hearing 
without leave of the Administrative Law Judge. 
8. Responses and answers to amended pleadings shall be 
filed within ten days of service of the amended pleading without 
further order of the Labor Commission. 
D. Default. 
1. If a respondent fails to file an answer as provided in 
Subsection C above, the Division may enter a default against the 
respondent. 
2. If default is entered against a respondent, the 
Division may conduct any further proceedings necessary to take 
evidence and determine the issues raised by che Application for 
Hearing without the participation of the party in default 
pursuant to Section 63-46b-ll(4), Utah Code. 
3. A default of a respondent shall not be construed to 
deprive the Employer's Reinsurance Fund or Uninsured Employers' 
FUPIU. oi. any appropriate u.ereuses . 
4. The defaulted party may file a motion to set aside the 
default under the procedures set forth in Section 63-46b-ll (3) , 
Utah Code. The Adjudication Division shall set aside defaults 
upon written and signed stipulation of all parties to the action. 
E. Waiver of Hearing. 
1. The parties may, with the approval of the 
administrative law judge, waive their right to a hearing and 
enter into a stipulated set of facts, which may be submitted to 
the administrative law judge. The administrative law judge may 
use the stipulated facts, medical records and evidence in the 
record to make a final determination of liability or refer the 
matter to the Medical Panel for consideration of the medical 
issues pursuant to R602-2-2. 
2. Stipulated facts shall include sufficient facts to 
address all the issues raised in the Application for Hearing and 
answer. 
3. In cases where Medical Panel review is required, the 
administrative law judge may forward the evidence in the record, 
including but not limited to, medical records, fact stipulations, 
radiographs and deposition transcripts, to a medical panel for 
assistance in resolving the medical issues. 
F. Discovery. 
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1. Upon filing the answer, the respondent and the 
petitioner may commence discovery. Discovery allowed under this 
rule may include interrogatories, requests for production of 
documents, depositions, and medical examinations. Discovery 
shall not include requests for admissions. Appropriate discovery 
under this rule shall focus on matters relevant to the claims and 
defenses at issue in the case. All discovery requests are deemed 
continuing and shall be promptly supplemented by the responding 
party as information comes available. 
2. Without leave of the administrative law judge, or 
written stipulation, any party may serve upon any other party 
written interrogatories, not exceeding 25 in number, including 
all discrete subparts, to be answered by the party served. The 
frequency or extent of use of interrogatories, requests for 
production of documents, medical examinations and/or depositions 
shall be limited by the administrative law judge if it is 
determined that: 
a. The discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or 
duplicative, or is obtainable from another source that is more 
convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; 
b. The party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity 
by discovery in the action to obtain the discovery sought; or 
c. The discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive, taking 
into account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, 
limitations on the parties; resources, and the importance of the 
issues at stake in the adjudication. 
3. Upon reasonable notice, the respondent may require the 
petitioner to submit to a medical examination by a physician of 
the respondent's choice. 
4. All parties may conduct depositions pursuant to the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 34A-1-3 08, Utah Code. 
5. ^  Requests for production of documents are allowed, but 
limited to matters relevant to the claims and defenses at issue 
in the case, and shall not include requests for documents 
provided with the petitioner's Application for Hearing, nor the 
respondents' answer. 
6. Parties shall diligently pursue discovery so as not to 
delay the adjudication of the claim. If a hearing has been 
scheduled, discovery motions shall be filed no later than 45 days 
prior to the hearing unless leave of the administrative law judge 
is obtained. 
7. Discovery motions shall contain copies of all relevant 
documents pertaining to the discovery at issue, such as mailing 
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certificates and follow up requests for discovery. The 
responding party shall have 10 days form the date the discovery 
motion is mailed to file a response to the discovery motion. 
8. Parties conducting discovery under this rule shall 
maintain mailing certificates and follow up letters regarding 
discovery to submit in the event Division Intervention is 
necessary to complete discovery. Discovery documents shall not 
be filed with the Division at the time they are forwarded to 
opposing parties. 
9. Any party who fails to obey an administrative law 
judge's discovery order shall be subject to the sanctions 
available under Rule 37, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
G. Subpoenas. 
1. Commission subpoena forms shall be used in all 
discovery proceedings to compel the attendance of witnesses. All 
subpoenas shall be signed by the administrative law judge 
assigned to the case, or the duty judge where the assigned judge 
is not available. Subpoenas to compel the attendance of 
witnesses shall be served at least 14 days prior to the hearing 
consistent with Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 45. Witness fees 
and mileage shall be paid by the party which subpoenas the 
witness. 
2. A subpoena to produce records shall be served on the 
holder of the record at least 14 days prior to the date specified 
in the subpoena has provided in Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 45. 
All fees associated with the production of documents shall be 
paid by the party which subpoenas the record. 
H. Medical Records Exhibit. 
1. The parties are expected to exchange medical records 
during the discovery period. 
2. Petitioner shall submit all relevant medical records 
contained in his/her possession to the respondent for the 
preparation of a joint medical records exhibit at least twenty 
(20) working days prior to the scheduled hearing. 
3. The respondent shall prepare a joint medical record 
exhibit containing all relevant medical records. The medical 
record exhibit shall include all relevant treatment records that 
tend*to prove or disprove a fact in issue. Hospital nurses' 
notes, duplicate materials, and other non-relevant materials need 
not be included in the medical record exhibit. 
4. The medical records shall be indexed, paginated, 
arranged by medical care provider in chronological order and 
bound. 
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5. The medical record exhibit prepared by the respondent 
shall be delivered to the Division and the petitioner or 
petitioner's counsel at least ten (10) working days prior to the 
hearing. Late-filed medical records may or may not be admitted 
at the discretion of the administrative law judge by stipulation 
or for good cause shown. 
6. The administrative law judge may require the respondent 
to submit an additional copy of the joint medical record exhibit 
in cases referred to a medical panel. 
7. The petitioner is responsible to obtain radiographs and 
diagnostic films for review by the medical panel. The 
administrative law judge shall issue subpoenas where necessary to 
obtain radiology films. 
I. Hearing. 
1. Notices of hearing shall be mailed to the addresses of 
record of the parties. The parties shall provide current 
addresses to the Division for receipt of notices or risk the 
entry of default and loss of the opportunity to participate at 
the hearing. 
2. Judgment may be entered without a hearing after default 
is entered or upon stipulation and waiver of a hearing by the 
parties. 
3. No later than 45 days prior to the scheduled hearing, 
all parties shall file a signed pretrial disclosure form that 
identifies; (1) fact witnesses the parties actually intend to 
call at the hearing; (2) expert witnesses the parties actually 
intend to call at the hearing; (3) language translator the 
parties intend to use at the hearing; (4) exhibits, including 
reports, the parties intent to offer in evidence at the hearing; 
(5) the specific benefits or relief claimed by the petitioner; 
(6) the specific defenses that the respondent actually intends to 
litigate; (7) whether or not a party anticipates that the case 
will take more than four hours of hearing time; (8) the job 
categories or titles the respondents claim the petitioner is 
capable of performing if the claim is for permanent total 
disability, and; (9) any other issues that the parties intend to 
a$k the administrative law judge to adjudicate. The 
administrative law judge may exclude witnesses, exhibits, 
evidence, claims, or defenses as appropriate of any part who 
fails to timely file a signed pre-trial disclosure form as set 
forth above. The parties shall supplement the pre-trial 
disclosure form with information that newly becomes available 
after filing the original form. The pre-trial disclosure form 
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does not replace other discovery allowed under these rules. 
4. If the petitioner requires the services of language 
translation during the hearing, the petitioner has the obligation 
of providing a person who can translate between the petitioner's 
native language and English during the hearing. If the 
respondents are dissatisfied with the proposed translator 
identified by the petitioner, the respondents may provide a 
qualified translator for the hearing at the respondent's expense. 
5. The petitioner shall appear at the hearing prepared to 
outline the benefits sought, such as the periods for which 
compensation and medical benefits are sought, the amounts of 
unpaid medical bills, and a permanent partial disability rating, 
if applicable. If mileage reimbursement for travel to receive 
medical care is sought, the petitioner shall bring documentation 
of mileage, including the dates, the medical provider seen and 
the total mileage. 
6. The respondent shall appear at the hearing prepared to 
address the merits of the petitioner's claim and provide evidence 
to support any defenses timely raised. 
7. Parties are expected to be prepared to present their 
evidence on the date the hearing is scheduled. Requests for 
continuances may be granted or denied at the discretion of the 
administrative law judge for good cause shown. Lack of diligence 
in preparing for the hearing shall not constitute good cause for 
a continuance. 
8. Subject to the continuing jurisdiction of the Labor 
Commission, the evidentiary record shall be deemed closed at the 
conclusion of the hearing, and no additional evidence will be 
accepted without leave of the administrative law judge. 
J. Motions-Time to Respond. 
Responses to all motions other than discovery motions shall 
be filed within ten (10) days from the date the motion was filed 
with the Division. Reply memoranda shall be filed within seven 
(7) days from the date a response was filed with the Division. 
K. Notices. 
1. Orders and notices mailed by the division to the last 
address of record provided by a party are deemed served on that 
party. 
2. Where an attorney appears on behalf of a party, notice 
of an action by the Division served on the attorney is considered 
notice to the party represented by the attorney. 
L. Form of Decisions. 
Decisions of the presiding officer in any adjudicative 
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proceeding shall be issued in accordance with the provisions of 
Section 63-46b-5 or 63-45b-10, Utah Code. 
M. Motions for Review. 
1. Any party to an adjudicative proceeding may obtain 
review of an Order issued by an Administrative Law Judge by 
filing a written request for review with the Adjudication 
Division in accordance with the provisions of Section 63-46b-12 
* and Section 34A-1-303, Utah Code. Unless a request for review is 
properly filed, the Administrative Law Judge's Order is the final 
order of the Commission. If a request for review is filed, other 
parties to the adjudicative proceeding may file a response within 
2 0 calendar days of the date the request for review was filed. 
Thereafter the Administrative Law Judge shall: 
a. Reopen the case and enter a Supplemental Order after 
holding such further hearing and receiving such further evidence 
as may be deemed necessary; 
b. Amend or modify the prior Order by a Supplemental 
Order; or 
c. Refer the entire case for review under Section 34A-2-
8 01, Utah Code. 
2. If the Administrative Law Judge enters a Supplemental 
Order, as provided in this subsection, it shall be final unless a 
request for review of the same is filed. 
N. Procedural Rules. 
In formal adjudicative proceedings, the Division shall 
generally follow the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure regarding 
discovery and the issuance of subpoenas, except as the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure are modified by the express provisions of 
Section 34A-2-802, Utah Code or as may be otherwise modified by 
these rules. 
O. Requests for Reconsideration and Petitions for Judicial 
Review. 
A request for consideration of an Order on Motion for Review 
may be allowed and shall be governed by the provisions of Section 
63-46b-13, Utah Code. Any petition for judicial review of final 
agency action shall be governed by the provisions of Section 63-
46b-14, Utah Code. 
R602-2-2. Guidelines for Utilization of Medical Panel. 
Pursuant to Section 34A-2-601, the Commission adopts the 
following guidelines in determining the necessity of submitting a 
case to a medical panel: 
A. A panel will be utilized by the Administrative Law Judge 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 99 CJ .S Workmens Compensation 
§ 567 to 572 
S4A-2-41L Temporary part ial disability — ^Jiiouni of pay-
ments. 
(1J If the injury causes temporary partial disability for work, tlie employee 
shall receive weekly compensation equal to: 
(a) 66 2/3% of the difference between the employee's average weekly 
wages before the accident and the weekly wages the employee is able to 
earn after the accident, but not more than 100% of the state average 
weekfy wage at the time of injury; plus 
(b) $5 for a dependent spouse and $5 for each dependent child under the 
age of 18 years, up to a maximum of four such dependent children, but onty 
up to a total weekly compensation that does not exceed 1009r of the state 
average weekly wage at the time of injury. 
(2) The commission ma}7 order an awTard for temporary partial disability for 
work at any time prior to 12 years after the date of the injury to an employee: 
(a) whose physical condition resulting from the injury is not finally 
healed and fixed 12 years after the date of injury; and 
(b) who files an application for hearing under Section 34A-2-417. 
(3 J The duration of weekly payments may not exceed 312 weeks nor 
continue more than 12 years after the date of the injury. Pa37ments shall 
terminate when the disability ends or the injured employee dies. 
History: C. 1953, 35-1-65.1, enacted by L. 411, substituted ' commission' for' department" 
1981, ch.^  287, § 2; 1988, ch. 116, § 2; 1990, m Subsection (2) and "34A-2-417'* for "35A-3-
ch. 69, § 2; renumbered by L. 1996, ch. 240, 417'1 in Subsection (2Kb), and made stylistic 
§ 154; renumbered by L. 1997, ch. 375, changes 
§ 119; 1999, ch. 261, fe 2. The 1999 amendment, effective May 3, 1999, 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend- substituted "12 years" for 'eight years' in two 
ment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this
 p l a c e s m Subsection (2) and in Subsection (3J. 
section, which formerly appeared as § 35A-3-
34A-2-412. Permanent part ial disability — Scale of pay-
ments. 
(1) An employee who sustained a permanent impairment as a result of an 
industrial accident and who files an application for hearing under Section 
34A-2-417 may receive a permanent partial disabilitj7 award from the commis-
sion. 
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P.O. Box 14 6 615 
Salt Lake City, Urah 84L14-6G1J 
Re: Amy C.aus-ng 
Case Wo. 2003B92 
Response tc Respondent's Objection to rhe 
Medical Panel Report. 
Dear Judge Sessions, 
Please accept tn is lerrer as our Response to Respondent's 
0biec~ion to tne Medical Panel Fepcrt. We agree vith Respondents 
tnat the 5% P?D tea a] ready been paid, bur we dxsacree that the 
parries st ipulated to a stabil ization date. 
lr 2002r tne part ies stipulated that a 5% rating of tne low 
sack was due no the original injury date of 18 March 1999, as 
opposed to rhe result ing fal l down one s t a i r s wnicn occurred or 
21 May 2000. I t makes no difference from a legal standooint if 
the impairment is Pased on the 1999 indus t r i a l accident or ohe 
resulting fal.l in 2000. We agree that tne 51 low back impairment 
has been paid by Responaents and no addit ional impairment i s due. 
we disagree that Petitioner s t ipulated to s tab i l i za t ion dare 
of January 14, 2002. There is no such s t ipula t ion outlined in 
writing. January 14, 2002 was rhe date of a hearing at which the 
parties agreed to certain specifically outlined benefits being 
paid, A hearing date is no basis for a determination of the 
compj et.i on of pe t i t ione r ' s medical treatment and s t ab i l i sa t ion of 
he^  medical condition. In fact, the Stipulation i t s e l f implies 
that toe pet i t ioner was not stable. I t includes payment of the 
ongoing medical care and physical therapy by Dxn Morgan (Order 
dated October 22, 2002, page 4.) 
Furthermore, impairment ratings do not equate to 
stabilization as cJ aimea by respondents. S tab i l i ty is defined by 
the Utah 2002 Impairment Gundes, page 9 as, 
MechcaJ stability (MMI) or f, :;ed slate of recovery, refers to a 
date m whj ch the period of hcal.i.ng has ended and the sondiz^on of 
the worker is not expected to materially improve or deteriorate by 
mare tftsn 3^ Whole Person ID the ensuing yea^. . .The date of 
medical stability and the date when the workers qualifies for an 
rumpa.:i_:rmcant irs-tn-i^ g can be two separate dates . (Emphasis added) 
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This definition and the separation of stabilization and 
impairment: is taken directly from Booms v. Raoo 720 P2d 136 3 
(Utah 1986), In Booms, the claimant argued that stopping payment 
of temporary total benefits upon medical stabilization left him 
with a "gap7' between the time he reached stabilization and the 
time his permanent partial disability began. The Supreme Court 
of Utah found this difference in the stabilization date and the 
payment of impairment was appropriate and there is no requirement 
that they occur on the same date. 
Finally, I must admit to being confused by respondents claim 
of a stipulated stabilization date. The current Stipulation of 
Facts and Proposed Medical Panel Questions includes a complete 
outline of petitioner's income from 1999 to 2004 so that 
Temporary Partial Disability could be calculated if petitioner 
was found not to be at MMI. (Stipulation of Fact and Proposed 
Medical Panel Questions, pg 5.) Stabilization was a primary 
issue in this case as reflected in the parties stipulated 
Proposed Question #3, "3- If the fusion surgery is not 
reasonable, has petitioner reached MMI?" I do not understand why 
respondents would, now argue that we stipulated to a January 14, 
2002 MMI date. 
We respectfully request that the Medical Panel Report be 
admitted into evidence. 
It appears that TTD and TPD have not been paid correctly 
throughout- this claim. (Compare TTD paid, Stipulation page 3, 
with the income chart, Stipulation pg 5.) Therefore, we request 
an Order for Temporary Total Disability/Temporary Partial 
Disability through MMI of June 10, 2004, less amounts actually 
paid, plus 8% interest. I would be happy to prepare a chart of 
these benefits if that would be helpful. 
In addition, in accordance with the Medical Panel Report, we 
request an Order for payment of medical care to date; immediate 
approval of the recommended treatment of knee injections; and 
payment of future medical care related to the treatment of the 
l°w back and right knee, including the traumatic arthritis which 
a^.y develop. We understand that based on the Medical Panel 
Report, workers compensation, coverage for the stroke and cervical 
injury will be denied. 
Very truly yours, 
ATKIN & ASSOCIATES, 
"K. ll^^'Atkin, Esq. 
C:
 Amy Clausing 
Theodore Kanell/Andrew Wadsworth 00145 
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December 1, 100 5 
Theodore E. Kanell, Esq 
Andrew Wadsworth, Esq. 
PL^T, ViIALLACE, CHRISTENSEN k KANELL 
136 South Temple STE 1700 
Salt hake City, Utah 84111-1131 
Fie : Amty C1 ausing 
Dear Ted and Andrew: 
Judge Sessions entered the Order in this case on September 
23; 2 005. To date it has not been paid. I have computed the 
TTD/TPD due, including credit for the benefits paid. My chart is 
attached. Gary was nice enough to compute the interest for us. 
His printout is attached as well. 
l i l t ; L U L d l uu iu t Jb u u v r ? z y j j o . ' i D JLD l l u / u r j u CLQU. ^ J U , 1 U 4 . / D i n 
simple interest at 8% for a total of $123,061.20. 
Please note that PPD has been paid in full and is not 
addressed in these computations. 
Since it has been over 60 days since the Order, I was 
preparing these numbers to request an abstract. However, "when I 
realized how complicated the numbers were, I assumed you had not 
yet had a chance to compute them. Therefore, I will delay any 
action until Deceniloer 15th in the hope that we can get the check 
issued before that date. Although our interest calculations end 
as of December 1st, if the benefits are paid on or before 
Dec ember iy~~, we 'will HOL re que SO aocii uionax interest. 
Please let me know if I can assist you in interpreting these 
charts, or provide additional information. 
Very truly yours, 
ATKIN & ASSOCIATES, 
KDA/d 
Enclosures 
7- ,-on - m ^ - n Q - i - n r r 
ATKIN & ASSOCIATES 
ATTORNEYS AT L A W 
" / 
K. Dawfi' A t k i n , Esq 
Amy Clausing 
ORDERED 
March 1 8. ] 999 - June 10. 2004 at $487.00 per week 
=272 Weeks at 487.00(max) per week 
=$132,464 plus 8% interest 
AMOUNTS PAID 
TTD August 17. 200 to October 25, 2000 = $5,090.00 
January 2, 2001 =$72.66 
April 9, 200 - April 22, 2002 = $974.00 
NOTE- DESPITE ORDER, CLIENT WORKED. TPD . 
Wage rate is $900.00 per wsek/ TTD max is 487.00 
E>ates/wages earned taken from Stipulation of Facts 
3/18/99-5/7/99 
7.28 Weeks % 
$900 - 400 x 66.67% =$333.35 $2,426.79 
5/8/99-12/29/99 
33.71 weeks (a), 
900-228X66.67%=$448.02 
12/30/99-1/10/00 TTD 
1.71 Weeks @ $487 
1/11/00-2/28/00 
7 weeks @ 
900-456 X66.67%=$296.01 
3/1/00-4/30/00 
8.71 weeks@ 
900-228X66.67%=$448.02 
5/1/00-5/20/00 
2.86 weeks@ 
900-45 6X66^67%=$296.01 
5/21//00-5/30/00 TTD 
1.43 weeksfa) $487.00 
5/31/00-6/21/00 
3 14 weeks @ 
900-456X66.67%=296.01 
$15,102.75 
$832.77 
$2,072.07 
$3,902.25 
$846.58 
$696.41 
$929.47 
6/22/00-6/28/00 TTD 
] \veeksff/.'.$487 $487.00 
6/20/00-8/16/00 
7 vveeksi^ 'i 
900-456X66.67%=$296.01 $2,072.07 
8/17/00-] 0/25/00 $5,090.00 PAID 
10/26/00-]/I/O 1 
9.71 weeks @ 
900-456X66i>7%=$296.01 $2,874.26 
1/02/01 $72.66 PAID 
1/3/01-4/4/02 
65.14 weeks@ 
900-456X66.67%=$296.01 $19,282.09 
4/5/02-4/8/02 TTD 
.57 weeks@.$487 $277.59 
4/9/02-4/22/02 $974.00 PAID 
4/23/02-5/30/02 
5.43 weeks@ 
900-228X66.67%=$448.02 $2,432.74 
5/31/02-10/19/02 
20.28 weeks@ 
900-456X66.67%=$296.01 $6,003.08 
1 0/20/02 to 5/4/03 
28.14 weeks@ 
900-499.20X66.67%=$267.21 $7,519.28 
5/5/03-2/28/04 TTD 
42.86 weeksto!487 $20,872.82 
3/1/04 to 5/25/04 
12.28 weeks@ 
900-480X66.67%=$280.01 $3,438.52 
5/26/04- 6/10/04 (MMI) TTD 
2.28 weeks@487 $1,110.36 
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ADDENDUM 
NO. 6 
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HLLuDOI'L L JANELL 
Decembei 0 200" 
A Dayn Allan 
A
xthiD LL Associates 
11 N find yuidPmud Suite 20C 
SaltLaLeCin UT Ml 06 
Re 
Claim No 
DOL 
Om File No 
±Jeai i_^avai 
This lettei vnh seive to lespondto youi lettei and fa> of Decembei 1 2005 m which 
von ontlined what yon felt w a s ""on1 client's claim foi tempoi a^ -v total and teumoi an\ pai unl 
disability payments You indicated that accoidmg to yom calculations $92,956 46 was owed 
m compensation benefits, with anothei $30,104 76 owed mint ei est foi a total of S123 061 20 
Aftei leviewmgyoui calculations and the pnoi oideis m this case I feel that youi 
calculations aie in enoi As you aie awaie, youi client ongmalh filed a claim on Febiuaiy 9, 
2001, m which she claimed entitlement to medical e>penses and tempoi ai^ total compensation 
as the lesult of knee lnpuies with two Lnee sui genes as the lesult of the mdustnal incident on 
Mai ch 18, 1999 Youi client v as iepi esented by Tim Allen in this fnst pi oceedmg On 
Octobei 11,2001 Mi Allen, at youi client's dnection amended that application foi heaiing to 
include the low bad injury and to claim entitlement to lecommended medical cai e and 
pei manent imp an meat 
Accoidmgl) at the time of heanng on Januaiy 14 2002, youi client's claims included 
low bacl and 1 nee inpines as the i esult of the mdustnal incident on Mai ch 1 cc, 1909 and youi 
client v as claiming entitlement to medical e penses i ecommended medical cai e, tempoi ai) 
total compensation and peimanent impaiimeiit Piioi to the heanng 15 ] 62 uC haa been paid 
to youi client foi tempoi ai) compensation benefits As you ai e aw ai e at heai nig on Januai y 
14, 2002 youi client stipulated to a settlement which was menionahzed in an oidei enleiecl b\ 
TuJge Shaion Eblen on Octobei 22, 2002 Oui settlement agiecment on tins date lesolved all 
issues pending at the heanng on Januai; 14 2002, winch included youi client s claim foi 
tempoi ai y compensation i elated to hei 1 nee and lov bacl m]unes B) agieemg to settle hei 
C S T / B L K H L T b c c 
A 
cTCW^P'r I CT~W PT 
Zachei-(GuLisingj-\ Fnto Lay 
21054082 
03 IS 1999 
01-215 
Dawn Atkin 
Decembei 6, 2005 
Page 2 
claim at hearing, your client waived any further claim for additional temporary compensation 
relating to her knee and low back, absent a change in condition 
The only change with respect to your client's condition as related to the low back and 
knee issues would be the third knee surgery which occurred on April 9, 2002, which was a 
palliative hardware removal. Your client received $974.00 in temporary total compensation for 
the period from the date of surgery on April 9, 2002 to April 22, 2002 Page 167 of the 
Medical Record Exhibit indicates that your client was released to work as of April 18, 2002, 
without restrictions to her hours. Accordingly, based on my review of the orders, medical 
records, and your computations, there is no outstanding compensation to be paid, as your 
client's neck condition has been found to be non-industrial. 
If you have any questions, please give me a call. 
Veiy truly yours, 
PLANT, CHRISTENSEN & K A N E L L 
TPIEODORE E KANELL 
ANDREW M. WADSWORTH 
AMW/mjw 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
1 HEREBY CERTIFY that, on the / day of April. 2007, two true and correct 
copies of the foregoing and within Employee's Brief were deposited with the United States 
mails, first class postage prepaid, and duly addressed for deliver}' to the following: 
Theodore E. Kanell. Esq. 
John H. Romney, Esq. 
PLANT, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL 
Attorneys for Employer 
136 East South Temple, Suite 1700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Allen L. Hennebold, Esq. 
Utah Labor Commission 
P.O. Box 146600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6600 
